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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from an initial judgment entitled "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order" (a copy of which is attached as App. A) and a subsequent final judgment entitled
"Order Regarding Attorney's Fees" (a copy of which is attached as App. B) entered by the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding.
This Court is vested with jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)0.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented for review in this appeal are:
1.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that appellee B. Ray Zoll ("Zoll")

was not serving as legal counsel for appellant Douglas T. Castleton ("Castleton") at the time
Zoll represented another client in the collection of a debt from Castleton.
This issue is a mixed question of fact and law reviewable under both a clearly
erroneous and correction of error standard. Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998).
However, because ". . .the Court has a special interest in administering the law governing
attorney ethical rules, a trial court's discretion [under State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-38
(Utah 1994)] is limited." Houghton v. Dent, of Health. 962 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1998). This
issue was preserved throughout the case, including Record on Appeal ("R.") 524-33, 1254-69,
Trial Exhs. 1-14, and Trial Transcript ("Tr.") at R. 1983, pp. 2-137.
2.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the matters at issue in Zoll's

previous representation of Castleton were not substantially factually related to the matter on
which Zoll represented a client adverse to Castleton.
1

This issue is a mixed question of fact and law reviewable under both a clearly
erroneous and correction of error standard. Jeffs. 970 P.2d at 1244. However, because " . . .
the Court has a special interest in administering the law governing attorney ethical rules, a trial
court's discretion [under State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936-38 (Utah 1994)] is limited."
Houghton. 962 P.2d at 61. This issue was preserved throughout the case, including R. 125469, Trial Exhs. 1-14, and Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 2-74, R. 1984, pp. 265-81.
3.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Zoll did not breach his fiduciary

duties of loyalty, confidentiality and good faith to Castleton.
This issue is a mixed question of fact and law reviewable under both a clearly
erroneous and correction of error standard. Jeffs. 970 P.2d at 1244. However, because " . . .
the Court has a special interest in administering the law governing attorney ethical rules, a trial
court's discretion [under State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936-38 (Utah 1994)] is limited."
Houghton. 962 P.2d at 61. This issue was preserved throughout the case including R. 524-33,
1254-69, Trial Exhs. 1-14, and Tr. at R. 1983, pp.2-137.
4.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Zoll's misconduct was not the

proximate cause of Castleton's claimed damages.
This issue normally is a question of fact reviewable under a clearly erroneous
standard. Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln - Mercurv Inc.. 909 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah 1996). In
this case, however, the issue is a question of law reviewable under a correction of error
standard given (a) the trial court's conclusion "as a matter of law" that Zoll's conduct " had
nothing to do" with the loss of Castleton's property, and (b) the trial court's incorrect

2

subsidiary legal conclusion that Zoll did not breach his fiduciary duty to Castleton.1 This issue
was preserved throughout this case, including R. 524-33, 1254-69, and 1660-66, Trial Exhs.
25 and 26, and Tr. at R. 1985, pp. 612-15, 681-86.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES OR RULES
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances or rules whose
interpretation is believed to be solely determinative of the issues on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case,

This is a case about a lawyer who betrayed his client. While or soon after serving as
Castleton's lawyer in three separate legal matters, Zoll decided to represent another client in
the collection of a debt from Castleton-a debt which Zoll himself characterized as "really
sensitive [and] ugly." (Trial Exh. 24 at p. 1 attached as App. C.) To help secure and collect
the debt from Castleton, Zoll orchestrated his client's self-help seizure of tens of thousands of
dollars of Castleton's personal property. Zoll then prepared and had Castleton sign an
agreement acknowledging that the seizure of his property was "consensual."

1

In other words, when and if this Court reverses the trial court's conclusion that Zoll did not breach his
fiduciary duty, it follows as a matter of law that Castleton, as the aggrieved subservient party in the fiduciary
relationship, can set aside the entire tainted transaction in which Zoll orchestrated the seizure of Castleton's
property. Von Hake v. Thomas. 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985); Baker v. Pattee. 684 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah
1984). Once the transaction is set aside, Castleton is entitled to either a restoration of the status quo as it existed
just before Zoll facilitated the seizure, or an award of damages for the value of the property. This relief is not
dependent upon an additional showing that Zoll's misconduct was the proximate cause of Castleton's loss. Under
Utah law, once the breach of fiduciary duty is established, the aggrieved principal is entitled to relief. Wheeler
bY and through Wheeler v. Mann. 763 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1988); Van Hake. 705 P.2d at 769; Baker. 684 P 2d
at 636.

3

To challenge Zoll's role in the seizure, Castleton filed suit for breach of fiduciary duty,
seeking actual damages for the value of his plundered property, punitive damages, and attorney
fees.

(R. 524-33.)

One aspect of this claim was that Zoll's breach of fiduciary duty

substantially assisted Zoll's other client in the unlawful confiscation of Castleton's property.
(R. 1664; Tr. at R. 1983 at 6:15-20; R. 1985 at 1682-83.)
B,

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in District Court,

Castleton's fiance, Suzanne Roderick ("Roderick"), filed her complaint in this case
("Roderick Complaint") in July 1996. (R. 1-42.) The Roderick Complaint sought damages
from Zoll and his client, Nathan Ricks ("Ricks"), for their conversion and destruction of
personal property (collectively "Castleton Property") which had been in Castleton's possession
(R. 1-42.) Castleton and two of his companies were named as defendants in the Roderick
Complaint because they had failed to repay loans which were secured by the Castleton
Property. (R. 1-10.)
Castleton subsequently filed a cross-claim ("Castleton Cross-Claim") against Zoll and
Ricks. (R. 524-33.)2 The Castleton Cross-Claim sought damages against Ricks for the fair
market value of a portion of the Castleton Property and actual and punitive damages against
Zoll for his breach of fiduciary duty.3 (R. 524-33.)

2

A copy of the Castleton Cross-Claim is attached as App. D.

3

After being served with the Castleton Cross-Claim, Zoll was less than cooperative during the discovery
phase of the case. During the first several months of discovery, Zoll failed to respond to Castleton's discovery
requests, prompting the filing of two separate motions to compel. (R. 673-80, 699-704.) The court subsequently
entered an order compelling discovery. (R. 830-34.) After Zoll failed to comply with the discovery order, the
court actually granted Castleton's motion for the entry of default judgment against Zoll. (R. 894-97.) Several
months later, however, the court vacated the dismissal order on the condition that Zoll pay a portion of
Castleton's attorney fees and that Zoll respond to the outstanding discovery. (R. 1193-96.) Shortly thereafter,
Castleton again moved to compel discovery from Zoll. (R. 1330-35.)

4

Shortly before trial, Castleton settled his claims against Ricks. (R. 1651-55; Trial Exh.
Q.) One of the settlement terms was that Castleton and Ricks agreed to "rescind, extinguish
and void ab initio" the agreement which ZoU had prepared shortly after he facilitated Ricks'
seizure of the Castleton Property — the agreement in which Castleton acknowledged that the
seizure was "consensual." (Trial Exh. Q at p. 4 attached as App. E.)
In September 1999, the court conducted a three-day bench trial on Castleton's breach of
fiduciary duty claim against ZoU. Several weeks later, it issued a memorandum decision. (R.
1692-1702.) The court concluded that although " . . . ZoU may have used very poor judgment
in this matter," Finding No. 32 at R. 1760, ZoU "did not breach any duty of loyalty or
confidentiality owed to Castleton" when ZoU facilitated the efforts of his other client, Ricks, to
seize the Castleton Property. IcL
Several months after the court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order [of Dismissal], it formally denied Zollfs motion for attorney fees. (R. 1939-42.) Eight
days later on May 10, 2000, Castleton filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. 1947-49.)
C.

Statement of Facts/
1.

Zoll is Castleton's Lawyer Until November 1996,

ZoU served as Castleton's legal counsel in three separate legal matters over a three-year
period.

(Finding Nos. 1-3, R. 1753; Trial Exh. 14 attached as App. F.) These matters

included a bankruptcy case in which Zoll represented Castleton for about thirteen months until
May 1995, the defense of a collection action in which Zoll represented Castleton for about five

4

Because the trial court found that Castleton was not a credible witness, R. 1758, this statement of facts
is based solely on the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial exhibits, and the deposition and
trial testimony of Zoll. It is not based on Castleton's testimony.

5

months until June 1995, and a post-divorce case in which Zoll represented Castleton for
nearly three years until November 1996.5 (Finding Nos. 1-3; Trial Exh. 14.) Zoll failed to
prepare any written engagement agreements with Castleton even though he recognized "it's the
better practice to do so" because it places the client on notice about his rights and obligations,
generally, and the terms and conditions of withdrawal, specifically. (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 30:1314 and pp. 30, 31.) In connection with these three legal matters, Castleton entrusted Zoll with
extensive personal financial information, including historical and current income, assets, and
liabilities. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 35, 36, 152, 277; Trial Exh. 38 attached as App. G.)
Zoll's representation of Castleton in his post-divorce case began in February 1994.
(Finding No. 1, R. 1753; Trial Exh. 1.) Zoll filed several pleadings and papers and handled at
least two court hearings for Castleton in the post-divorce case:

In February 1994, Zoll

defended Castleton in a contempt proceeding, and in October 1994, Zoll represented Castleton
at a trial on his petition to modify the divorce decree. (R. 1753; Trial Exhs. 1-13.) In January
1995, the lawyer for Castleton1 s former wife prepared and submitted a proposed Order
Modifying Decree of Divorce ("Proposed Order").

(Tr. at R. 1983, p. 48; Trial Exh. 8

attached as App. H.) One month later, Zoll prepared and filed an objection ("Objection") to
the Proposed Order.

(Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 50-52; Trial Exh. 9 attached as App. I.)

The

divorce court scheduled a hearing on Zollfs Objection for May 1, 1995, but subsequently
struck that hearing date.6 (Finding No. 1, R. 1753; Trial Exhs. 10, 11.)

5

The trial court did find that, as of April 1996, ". . . there was no attorney-client relationship between
Zoll and Castleton." (Finding No. 25, R. 1758.) This is clearly erroneous, however, given Zoll's undeniable
status as Castleton's counsel of record in the divorce case until Zoll's filed notice of withdrawal in November
1996. (See Trial Exh. 14 attached as App. F, and Argument C, infra at pp. 29-34.)
6

The hearing on the Objection was eventually conducted in February 1997. (Trial Exh. 12 at p. 8.)

6

Zoll remained as Castleton's counsel of record in the post-divorce case until November
1996 when he filed a written notice of withdrawal as Castleton's lawyer.7 (Trial Exh. 14
attached as App. F.; Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 58, 59.) Zoll filed the notice because his ". . . staff
was seeing some activity with [opposing counsel] and wanted to make sure she was clear and
the court file was clear that the prior termination had been effectuated by the formal record or
some formal filing in the file itself." (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 63.) Zoll's office sent a copy of the
notice of withdrawal to Castleton at that time. (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 63; Trial Exh. 14.)
2.

Zoll Begins, But Does Not Complete, Efforts to Withdraw
During 1995,

During 1995, Castleton began falling behind on his payments of Zoll's billing
statements.8 (R. 1753; Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 75, 76.) Before August 1995, Zoll believed that he
had already withdrawn as Castleton's lawyer and that Castleton understood this. (Tr. at R.
1983, pp. 76-79.) Zoll nevertheless prepared and sent to Castleton a letter dated August 2,

7

Zoll did testify that he had a "very vague" memory that he and Castleton reached an "understanding"
that it was ". . .not necessary to pursue or press the issue on the Objection." (Tr. at R. 55.) However, Zoll
could not recall when the "understanding" was reached, did not confirm it in writing, did not withdraw the
Objection, and did not inform opposing counsel, the court clerk or the assigned judge of the existence or terms of
the vaguely recalled "understanding." (Tr. at R. 1983 at pp. 57-59.) Moreover, Zoll never referenced this
"understanding" before trial in either his letter to Castleton's lawyer in this case, in his reply to Castleton's
CrossClaim, or in opposition to Castleton's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 94-99.) Indeed,
ZoU's pre-trial position on the issue of his written Objection was that "an objection that is not resolved in a year is
a dead objection." (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 98.) Zoll never took the position before trial that he and Castleton had an
"understanding" not to pursue the Objection. Even ZoU's trial counsel abandoned the "understanding" argument
in his summation: "And [ZoU's] story basically is, I've represented this man on three matters. I finished them all
except for the objection." (Tr. at R. 1985 at 667:16-18.) (Emphasis added.) And even if such an
"understanding" was reached, it is undisputed that Zoll remained in the case and did not file his withdrawal until
November 1996, seven months after he helped his other client (Ricks) to collect a debt from Castleton. (Trial
Exh. 14 attached as App. F.)
8

This was not surprising to Zoll given his admitted concern at the outset of the engagement about
Castleton's ability to pay ZoU's bUls because he knew that Castleton was financially strapped. (Tr. at R. 1983,
pp. 28-30.)

7

1995 ("August 1995 Letter"). (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 79; Trial Exh. 21 attached as App. J.) The
August 1995 Letter stated in pertinent part:
I will accept a 15% reduction in the amount of your bill if it is
paid in cash within two (2) weeks from the date hereof. In any
event, if you do not make arrangements with our office to begin
payment on your bill within two (2) weeks from the date hereof, I
will have no other option but to withdraw as your counsel in the
matters for which this law firm has represented you and to pursue
collection of this amount from you.
(Emphasis added.) ZoU admitted that his August 1995 Letter " . . . was not as clear as [he]
would have liked" given his belief that he had already withdrawn, but his use of the future
tense "will" to describe his intent to withdraw later if Castleton failed to make arrangements to
pay his bill. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 84, 85.)
In response to ZoU's August 1995 Letter, Castleton made a $100 payment to ZoU's
firm in September 1995. (Finding No. 6, R. 1754; Trial Exh. 22.) Even though Zoll testified
that his August 1995 Letter evidenced his immediate withdrawal, ZoU's firm did not pursue
collection of the account from Castleton (as threatened in the letter) until after trial in this case
was completed, and did not withdraw as counsel in the post-divorce case (as threatened in the
letter) until November 1996. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 82, 83; Trial Exh. 14.) Indeed, on April 2
or 3, 1996, Castleton received a billing statement from Zoll's law firm which charged
Castleton for one hour of "professional services rendered" by one of ZoU's employees for
Castleton on March 21, 1996.9 (Trial Exh. 27 attached as App. K.)

9

Castleton did testify that Zoll himself did not perform further legal work for Castleton after Zoll filed
the Objection to the Proposed Order in the divorce case in February 1995. (Tr. at R. 1988 at 89:4-7.) Castleton
never testified, however, that Zoll's staff did not perform the professional services described in the Zoll & Branch
billing statement. And while Zoll has suggested and may argue that his April 1996 billing statement to Castleton
was a mistake, there is no evidence that Zoll told Castleton it was a mistake before or at the time of the April 8,
1996 meeting at Zoll's office at which Zoll facilitated the seizure of Castleton's property.

8

3.

Still Serving as Castleton's Lawyer. Zoll Ambushes Castleton
and Facilitates the Seizure of Castletonfs Property,

On April 8, 1996-while the written Objection that Zoll had prepared and filed for
Castleton was still pending in the divorce action, five days after Zoll issued a billing statement
to Castleton reflecting "professional services rendered" recently by Zoll's office, and more
than seven months before Zoll filed his withdrawal as Castleton's lawyer in the divorce
action~Zoll called Castleton and asked him to come immediately to his office to meet with Zoll
and Ricks about Castleton's employment relationship with Ricks' company.10 (Finding No. 11,
R. 1755.) Zoll failed to disclose in advance to Castleton that Zoll and Ricks intended to accuse
Castleton of having stolen money from Ricks by submitting inflated invoices. IcL Zoll never
prepared or provided any oral or written disclosures of any potential conflict of interest in his
simultaneous representation of Castleton and Ricks; never had either client sign any waiver of
conflict; and never told Castleton it would be prudent for him to retain independent legal
counsel to accompany him to the meeting or to advise him about the implications of the conflict
of interest. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 106, 107.)11 Zoll failed to take this action even though he
knew the meeting with Castleton would address a "very serious situation" which was "really
sensitive [and] ugly." (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 125; Trial Exh. 24 at p. 1.) Indeed, Castleton
subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of Class A misdemeanor theft. (Finding No. 17, R.
1757.)

10

Zoll had previously represented Ricks in several matters and considered him to be a "good" client
because, unlike Castleton, he always paid his bill. (Tr. at R. 1983 at 102:1-17.)
11

Zoll's testimony on this point was emphatic and unapologetic: "Obviously that wasn't in the
discussion." (R. 1260.)

9

Zoll tape recorded a portion of the April 8, 1996 meeting between himself, Ricks and
Castleton. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 112-14; Trial Exh. 24 attached as App. C.) The transcript of
their conversation reflects that Castleton immediately asked Zoll to confirm that he was also
serving as Castleton's lawyer.

(Trial Exh. 24 at p.2.)

Zoll responded by saying that he

"represented [Castleton] in [Castleton's] divorce" and that "[Zoll] ha[s] nothing to do with that
in this case." Id. at p. 3. The transcript also reflects that Zoll accused Castleton of engaging
in criminal misconduct by presenting inflated invoices to Ricks. IcL

It further reflects Zoll's

belief that Castleton's motivation for overcharging Ricks was the financial pressure Castleton's
former wife was placing on him-the same former wife with whom Zoll was dealing when he
represented Castleton in the divorce case. (Trial Exh. 24 at p. 2.) n
Zoll described Castleton's predicament at the April 8, 1996 meeting as ". . . like
having a kid with his hand in the cookie jar when [Castleton] realized we had the information
[about the inflated invoices]." (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 115.) Ricks described Castleton's plight in
much the same way: ". . . i t was pretty apparent that, you know, Doug was caught, and he
was pretty contrite, I would say." (Tr. at R. 1984, p. 452.)
Near the end of the tape recorded meeting, Zoll and Ricks questioned Castleton about
his purchase of "computers, equipment and software" which Zoll had determined were located
at Castleton's apartment. (Trial Exh. 24 at p. 5.) After Castleton told Zoll that Castleton's
computer equipment was at his apartment, Zoll decided to stop recording the conversation,

12

The transcript shows the following exchange:
Zoll:
Castleton:
Zoll:

Why did you do it, Doug?
Just didn't have enough money to make ends meet.
Pressure from your ex?

(Trial Exh. 24 at p. 2.)

10

remarking, "well let me tell you what, what we, what I think we should do." (Trial Exh. 24 at
p. 5.) Zoll then "facilitated" Ricks' seizure of Castleton's computers, hardware, software, and
"other electronic equipment" as "security for the debt that Castleton owed Ricks." (Finding
Nos. 13 and 35, R. 1755, 56, 60.) The trial court expressly concluded that "Zoll facilitated
this arrangement by getting the parties together and drafting a notice of termination letter and
an agreement between the parties," and that Zoll was " . . . aware that certain property was
taken from Castleton's home and was going to be held by Ricks for security purposes."
(Finding No. 35, R. 1760.)
When Ricks arrived at Castleton's apartment right after their meeting with Zoll, he took
not only the computer equipment, but a multitude of additional items owned by Castleton and
his fiance, Roderick.

(Finding No. 14, R. 1756; Trial Exh. 29.)

These items included

hundreds of compact discs, laser discs, a microwave oven, stereo equipment, a television set
that Castleton had bought for his children, a cell phone, and other property and personal
effects. (Trial Exh. 29; Tr. at R. 1985, pp. 476, 477.)13
The next day, April 9, 1996, Zoll prepared and provided Castleton with a written
Notice of Termination to extinguish Castleton's independent contractor relationship with Ricks.
(Finding No. 15, R. 1756; Tr. at R. 1983, p. 129.) The Notice of Termination was addressed
to Castleton by Zoll and stated in pertinent part:
Pursuant to our understanding and as you have consented, we
[Zoll and Ricks] have picked up and caused to be delivered to the
13

The trial court determined that these additional items of property were taken with Castleton's
"consent." (Finding No. 14, R. 1756.) However, the trial court ignored the 1999 Settlement Agreement between
Castleton and Ricks which voided their April 1996 settlement agreement and, with it, the understanding that the
property seizure was "consensual." (Trial Exh. Q at p. 4; App. E.) And given the plainly coercive nature of the
property transfer arrangement which Zoll had "facilitated," and given his breach of fiduciary duty, any such
consent was obviously voidable. See Argument C, infra at pp. 29-34.
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NS Group offices certain equipment, files, software, furnishings
and the like from your apartment to be held by NS Group offices
pending our further investigation of the amount of money that has
been inappropriately obtained by you.
(Trial Exh. 25 attached as App. L.) (Emphasis added.)14
Zoll then drafted a Settlement Agreement which Ricks and Castleton signed on April
19, 1996 ("1996 Settlement Agreement"). (R. 1756; Trial Exh. 26 attached as App. M.) The
1996 Settlement Agreement stated, among other things, that Castleton acknowledged liability
to Ricks in an amount to be determined through a future accounting and that the property was
being "consensually" held to secure Castleton's repayment pending the accounting. (Finding
No. 16, R. 1756; Trial Exh. 26 at p. 2.)
In the face of these facts, the trial court ruled that while \ . .Mr. Zoll may have used
very poor judgment in this matter, and could have done much more to clarify the issue with
Castleton at the time of the meeting in April of 1996, under the circumstances of this case Q he
did not breach any duty of loyalty or confidentiality owed to Mr. Castleton under Rule 1.9 or
Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct." (Finding No. 32, R. 1760.)
The court further ruled that " . . . under all the circumstances, as of the April 1996
meeting, there was no attorney-client relationship between Zoll and Castleton," Finding No.
25, R. 1758; that the three legal matters in which Zoll had represented Castleton were not
substantially factually related to the matter in which Zoll was assisting Ricks in collecting a
debt from Castleton, Finding No. 29, R. 1759; that Castleton " . . . failed to provide the court

14

Even though Zoll's Notice of Termination explicitly referenced Zoll's recognition that the additional
property he and Ricks had confiscated, i.e., "furnishings and the like," went far beyond what was discussed
during the tape-recorded discussion at Zoll's office the evening before, the trial court apparently rejected
Castleton's argument that Zoll's Notice of Termination was a ratification of Ricks' taking of these additional
items. This argument was preserved at Tr. at R. 1983, p. 5:12-18; R. 1985, p. 685:11-25, p. 686:1-6.
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with evidence of any specific information obtained by ZoU in his representation of Castleton
that was either confidential or that was not otherwise generally known, that could subsequently
have been used against Castleton to Ricks' advantage," Finding No. 31, R. 1760; that " . . .
Zoll had nothing to do with the taking of additional property by Ricks, the damage to the
property while in Ricks' possession, or the circumstances of Ricks failing to return property
that he agreed to return," Conclusion No. 9, R. 1762; that Ricks' seizure and failure to return
Castleton's property was ". . .an independent intervening cause that severed the connection
between Zoll's conduct and Castleton's claimed damages," Conclusion No. 12, R. 1762; and
that "Castleton has failed to establish any damages directly attributable to Zoll's action."
(Conclusion No. 13, R. 1763.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Zoll Was Castleton's Lawyer at the Time Zoll Helped His Other
Client Collect a Debt from Castleton,

When Zoll facilitated Ricks' seizure of Castleton's property, Zoll was in an attorneyclient relationship with Castleton. Specifically, Zoll was counsel of record for Castleton in
Castleton's post-divorce proceeding. Zoll had vigorously defended Castleton in an evidentiary
contempt hearing and at a trial to modify Castleton's divorce decree in that case. Once Zoll
prepared and filed his Objection to the Proposed Order prepared by opposing counsel, Zoll
was precluded by the court's rules of practice and case law from withdrawing without court
approval. And even assuming that Zoll could unilaterally withdraw without court approval, he
did not do so until November 1996-more than seven months after he ambushed Castleton at
his law office. Therefore, until Zoll completed his withdrawal, he continued to be Castleton's
lawyer.
13

2.

Even If it is Determined ZoU Was Not Castleton!s Lawyer at the
Time Zoll Was Representing Ricks, the Matter in Which Zoll was
Representing Ricks Was Substantially Factually Related to the Three
Matters in Which Zoll Previously Had Represented Castleton, As
Such. Zoll Could Not Serve as Ricks1 Lawyer in Collecting a Debt
From Castleton.

The legal and ethical proscriptions against disclosure of confidential client information
mean that a lawyer cannot represent a client against a former client in the same or a
substantially factually related matter in which the current client's interest is materially adverse
to that of the former client, unless the former client consents after consultation. Under Utah
law, this rule is designed to prevent even the possibility that a lawyer might use information
given in confidence by a former client in a later action against that client.
In this case, the three previous matters in which Zoll represented Castleton~the divorce
case, the bankruptcy case, and the collection case-each involved the efforts of a creditor to
collect a debt from Castleton. This is precisely what was at issue in Zoll's efforts to assist
Ricks in collecting a debt from Castleton through a seizure of Castleton1 s property. Because of
this commonality of issues and Castleton1 s entrustment of confidential information with Zoll,
Zoll was prohibited from taking a position adverse to Castleton and from exploiting this
confidential information against Castleton.
3.

ZoU Breached His Fiduciary Duties of Lovaltv. Confidentiality and
Good Faith to Castleton.

Lawyers owe their clients an elevated fiduciary duty to exercise utmost honesty, fair
dealing, and fidelity. A critically important component of this duty is the responsibility to act
with undivided loyalty toward the client. Zoll violated his duty of loyalty to Castleton by
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representing another client in the collection of a debt from Castleton. Indeed, the dimensions
of Zoll's misconduct are mind-boggling. They include:
- Zoll's decision to have Castleton appear at his office without informing Castleton of
the true reason for the meeting~to confront Castleton with evidence that he had purposely
overbilled ZoU's other client, Ricks.
- Zollfs failure to prepare or provide any disclosures of potential conflicts of interest in
his simultaneous representation of Castleton and Ricks.
- Zoll's failure to have either client sign any waiver of conflict.
- ZoU's failure to advise Castleton that it would be prudent for him to retain
independent legal counsel to accompany him to the meeting or to advise him about the
implications of Zoll's conflict of interest.
- ZoU's failure to abort the meeting when Castleton asked him to confirm that Zoll was
also serving as Castleton's lawyer.
- Zoll's accusation at the meeting that Castleton was guilty of criminal misconduct.
- ZoU's use of Castleton's confidential financial information to help enforce Ricks'
claim.
- Zoll's orchestration of Ricks' seizure of Castleton's property.
- ZoU's overreaching by having Castleton sign a document acknowledging that the
seizure was "consenual."
It is difficult to conceive of conduct more at odds with the lawyer's duty of loyalty,
confidentiality and fair dealing.

The trial court clearly erred by characterizing Zoll's

misconduct as merely "very poor judgment," and not as flagrant breaches of fiduciary duty.
15

4.

The Trial Court's Own Findings of Fact and the Underlying
Evidence Flatly Contradict Its Determination That Zoll Was Not
Responsible for the Loss of the Property That Ricks Seized from
Castleton,

Among the more dubious of the trial court's conclusions was its declaration that "as a
matter of law" " . . . Zoll had nothing to do with the taking of additional property by [his other
client] Ricks, the damage to the property while in Ricks1 possession or the circumstances of
Ricks' failure to return the property that he had agreed to return."15 Indeed, this conclusion is
flatly contradicted by (a) the trial court's own factual findings that "Zoll was aware that certain
property was taken from Castleton's home and was going to be held by Ricks for security
purposes [and] Zoll facilitated this arrangement by getting the parties together and drafting a
notice of termination letter and an agreement between the parties";16 (b) Zoll's testimony that
he thought it was a "good idea that Mr. Ricks take the property";17 (c) Zoll's own written
notice the day after the seizure that both he and Ricks had confiscated Castleton's property;18
and (d) Zoll's testimony that he never provided Castleton with the accounting that was an
essential precondition to any return of Castleton's property.19
These facts, taken alone, are fatal to the trial court's conclusion that Zoll's misconduct
was not the proximate cause of Castleton's loss. When these facts are viewed in the light of
Zoll's breach of fiduciary duty, they compellingly establish that Zoll substantially assisted

15

Conclusion No. 9, R. 1762.

16

Finding No. 35, R. 1760.

17

Tr. atR. 1983 at 129:1-5.

18

Trial Exh. 25.

19

Tr. atR. 1983 at 131:1-3.

16

Ricks in his campaign to strip Castleton of his property. Zoll, therefore, was the legal cause of
Castleton's loss. The trial court's conclusion to the contrary cannot stand.
ARGUMENT
A.

ZOLL WAS CASTLETON'S LAWYER AT THE TIME ZOLL
HELPED HIS OTHER CLIENT COLLECT A DEBT FROM, AND
SEIZE THE PROPERTY OF, CASTLETON,

If a lawyer desires to withdraw from representation, he or she must provide clear notice
to the client and comply with any applicable rules requiring court approval. See, e.g.. Hanlin
v. Mitchelson. 794 F.2d 834, 842 (2nd Cir. 1986) (". . . a withdrawing attorney must give a
client fclear and unambiguous' notice of the attorney's intent to withdraw from representation.
Beyond this notice requirement, the Code of Professional Responsibility imposes a broader
duty [to comply with court-imposed notice requirements and to avoid foreseeable prejudice to
the rights of the client]."); Columbus Credit Co. v. Evans. 613 N.E.2d 671, 675 (Ohio App.
1992) ("An attorney is not free to withdraw from the relationship absent notice to his client
and, if required by the rules of court where the attorney is representing the client, permission
from the court."); In re: Pullev. 182 Bankr. Rptr. 35, 35 n.l (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1995) ("[t]he
fact that defendant's counsel has moved to withdraw as counsel does not relieve him of the
duty to represent his client until such time as an order is entered granting permission to
withdraw as counsel"); Cardot v. Lauff. 262 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1980) ("Most courts require
that before an attorney can unilaterally sever the attorney-client relationship, he must give
reasonable notice to his client of his intention to withdraw. If the withdrawal involves a matter
pending in court, there is the further requirement the attorney secure court permission for his
withdrawal.").
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Moreover, the client's failure to stay current on his account with the lawyer does not
justify the lawyer's uncommunicated and unapproved abandonment of the client:
Once a lawyer accepts retainer to represent a client, he is
obligated to exert his best efforts wholeheartedly to advance the
client's legitimate interests with fidelity and diligence until he is
relieved of that obligation either by his client or the court. The
failure of a client to pay for his services does not relieve a lawyer
of his duty to perform them completely and on time, save only
when relieved as above.
In the Matter of Daggs. 187 N.W.2d 227, 228 (Mich. 1971).
As the Mississippi Supreme Court aptly observed in Hurst v. Southwest Mississippi
Legal Services Corp., 610 So.2d 374, 382 (Miss. 1992):
. . . [A]ny time an attorney undertakes to represent a client in any
court of record in this state, there attaches at that moment a legal,
ethical, professional and moral obligation to continue with that
representation until such time as he is properly relieved by the
court of record before whom he has undertaken to represent a
client. This is true regardless of the circumstances under which
his representation of that client may be terminated.
This
withdrawal may be accomplished only by the filing of a motion
with the court with proper notice to the client.
(quoting, Mvers v. Mississippi State Bar. 480 S.2d 1080, 1092 (Miss. 1986).
This Court has long recognized that unless and until the lawyer withdraws from the
engagement, his fiduciary duty to the client continues until entry of final judgment. Lundberg
v. Backman. 358 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1961). Until withdrawal occurs, the lawyer's status as
counsel of record " . . . constitute(s) his client's appearance pursuant to the agency relationship
that exists between a client and an attorney." Loporto v. Hoegemann. 982 P.2d 586, 589
(Utah App. 1999).

And the lawyer's withdrawal from the case is not complete until he

prepares and files with the trial court a written notice to that effect. Sperrv v. Smith. 694 P.2d
581, 582 (Utah 1984).
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This requirement of written notice is found in Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, which governs "all counsel in civil proceedings and trial courts of record."
C.J.A. 4-506. It provides that when a motion has been filed and the trial court has not issued
an order on that motion, "an attorney may not withdraw except upon motion and order of the
court." C.J. A. 4-506(1). Notably, the rule also provides that if a lawyer " . . . withdraws
under circumstances where court approval is not required, the notice of withdrawal shall
include a statement by the attorney that no motion has been filed on which the court has not
issued an order . . . ." C.J.A. 4-506(2) (emphasis added).
These principles and rules compel the conclusion that Zoll was still serving as
Castleton1 s lawyer during Zoll's April 1996 ambush and inquisition of Castleton and the
seizure of his property. Zoll was counsel of record for Castleton in Castleton's divorce case.
(Finding No. 1, R. 1753; Trial Exhs. 1-14.) In that role, Zoll filed numerous pleadings and
papers and handled at least two court hearings for Castleton during 1994. (R. 1753; Trial
Exhs. 1-13.)

In early 1995, Zoll prepared and filed his written Objection to opposing

counsel's Proposed Order. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 50-52; Trial Exh. 9 attached as App. I.)

The

Objection remained on file with the court until it was resolved in early 1997. (Trial Exh. 12 at
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As indicated at n. 7, supra. Zoll did testify that he had a "very vague" memory that he and
Castleton reached an "understanding" that it was ". . .not necessary to pursue or press the issue on the
Objection." Tr. at R. 55.) However, Zoll could not recall when the "understanding" was reached, did not
confirm it in writing, did not withdraw the Objection, and did not inform opposing counsel, the court clerk or the
assigned judge of the existence or terms of the vaguely recalled "understanding." (Tr. at R. 1983 at pp. 57-59.)
Moreover, Zoll never referenced this "understanding" before trial in either his letter to Castleton's lawyer in this
case, in his reply to Castleton's Cross-Claim, or in opposition to Castleton's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Tr.
at R. 1983, pp. 9499.) Indeed, Zoll's pre-trial position on the issue of his written Objection was that "an
objection that is not resolved in a year is a dead objection." (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 98.) Zoll never took the position
before trial that he and Castleton had an "understanding" not to pursue the Objection. Even Zoll's trial counsel
abandoned the "understanding" argument in his summation: "And [Zoll's] story basically is, I've represented this
man on three matters. I finished them all except for the objection." (Tr. at R. 1985 at 667:16-18.) (Emphasis
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Although the trial court concluded that the attorney-client relationship between Zoll and
Castleton ended before the April 1996 meeting at Zoll's office and the property seizure at
Castleton's home, see Finding No. 25 and Conclusion Nos. 2 and 3, Zoll, as a matter of law,
clearly remained as Castleton's lawyer of record in the divorce case at least until November
1996 when he filed his written notice of withdrawal.21 Even then, Zoll failed to seek or obtain
court approval for the withdrawal, as required by Rule 4-506(1), or certify in his notice that
there were no unresolved motions, as required by Rule 4-506(2).

This obviously destroys

added.)
And even if such an "understanding" was reached, it is undisputed that Zoll remained in the case and
did not file his withdrawal until November 1996, seven months after he helped his other client (Ricks) to collect a
debt from Castleton. (Trial Exh. 14 attached as App. F.) This "understanding," therefore, could not and did not
terminate the lawyer-client relationship.
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Amazingly, Zoll's expert witness, Lee Rudd, did not even consider this issue in opining that the
attorney-client relationship had ended by April 1996:
Q.

So you think it is permissible for a lawyer to withdraw unilaterally when he
has filed an objection that hasn't yet been resolved?

A.

I would (inaudible) that question. I haven't looked at that issue to that effect.

(Tr. atR. 1985 at 638:10-14.)
In addition, Mr. Rudd did not consider Lundberg v. Backman. 358 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1961), in
which this Court held that until the lawyer withdraws, his fiduciary duty continues until the entry of final
judgment. (Tr. at R. 1985 at 635:2-10.) Indeed, in rendering his opinion, Mr. Rudd testified that he ". . . only
looked at [his own] conduct and that of the attorneys that [he] dealt with over the last thirty years." (Tr. at R.
1985 at 635:12-13.) Mr. Rudd explained his opinion that Zoll withdrew as Castleton's lawyer in August 1995 as
follows:
And if you go a long period of time with no communication, that's an indication and an
allowance for the attorney to realize that he does not represent the client and the client
would be unable to make a reasonable decision that he is represented by an attorney.
(Tr. atR. 1985 at 636:1-6.)
By contrast, Castleton's expert witness, Ellen Maycock, opined that Zoll committed a ". . . very
serious breach of [his] duty to his client" which is not even a "close question." (Tr. at R. 1984 at 277:1-5.)
When Ms. Maycock testified on cross-examination that a lawyer is legally required " . . . to file a withdrawal or
get court permission to withdraw in all pending matters," Zoll's counsel conceded "[w]ell, that would be nice if
we had that, but under the facts of this case, we don't have t h a t . . . . " (Tr. al R. 1984 at 298:2-5.)
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Zollfs anemic trial story that he had a "very vague" memory that he and Castleton had an
"understanding" not to pursue the Objection. (See n. 20, supra.) If the Objection truly had
been withdrawn, Zoll was required to certify that fact in his notice. He did not do so.
Until the withdrawal was filed, ZoU's opposing counsel either believed he was still
representing Castleton or was at least confused about ZoU's status. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 63,
64.) This is precisely why Utah law provides that until a lawyer is validly "out," the lawyer is
undeniably "in."

For Zoll, this means that he remained as Castleton's lawyer until he

completed his withdrawal. Loporto. 982 P.2d at 589; Sperrv. 694 P.2d at 582; Lundberg, 358
P.2d at 989.
However, according to the trial court, "the attorney-client relationship between Zoll
and Castleton ended when Castleton failed to comply with the terms of the August 1995
letter." (Conclusion No. 2, R. 1761.) The letter stated in relevant part:
I will accept a 15% reduction in the amount of your bill if it is
paid in cash within two (2) weeks from the date hereof. In any
event, if you do not make arrangements with our office to begin
payment on your bill within two (2) weeks from the date hereof, I
will have no other option but to withdraw as your counsel in the
matters for which this law firm has represented you and to pursue
collection of this amount from you.
The trial court's reliance on the August 1995 Letter was misplaced for several reasons.
First, Zoll himself admitted that the letter "was not as clear as [he] would have liked." (Tr. at
R. 1983, pp. 84, 85.) Zoll believed he had already withdrawn and that Castleton understood
this, yet Zoll employed the future tense "will" to describe his intent to withdraw later if
Castleton did not make arrangements to begin paying his bill. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 76-79.)
Second, even ZoU's own expert witness testified that the August 1995 Letter, by itself, was not
enough to terminate the attorney-client relationship. (Tr. at R. 1985 at 629: 5, 6.)
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Next, the law is clear that if a lawyer fails to clearly inform his client of his intention to
withdraw, the relationship is not terminated. This point was illustrated in North Carolina State
Bar v. Sheffield. 326 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. App. 1985). In that case, a lawyer claimed that his
withdrawal from the case had been effected by his preparation of a letter in which he wrote
that "I do not see that I can handle this for you for a number of reasons," and added, "[p]lease
come to this office some time this week or next so we can discuss this." According to the
court, "at best, this letter bespeaks a somewhat equivocal intention on the [lawyer's] part to
end his involvement with the lawsuit.

It is not the legal equivalent of withdrawing from

representation." Id. at 326.
Zoll's August 1995 Letter is similarly deficient. Specifically, the Letter, on its face,
was not a declaration of a present intent to terminate the relationship. Rather, it only reflected
Zoll's intention to withdraw in the future if Castleton failed to make arrangements to pay his
bill.22

While the trial court concluded that Castleton made no such arrangements, it is

undisputed that Castleton did make a $100 payment soon after and in response to the August
1995 Letter.

(Finding No. 6, R. 1754; Trial Exh. 22.)

By doing so, Castleton plainly

complied with the letter's admonition that he make "arrangements" "to begin payment." If
Zoll believed that Castleton1 s partial payment was not enough to justify Zoll's continuing as
Castleton's lawyer, it was Zoll who was obligated to clearly notify Castleton of that fact.
Castleton was not obligated to read Zoll's mind.

22

Even Zoll acknowledged this in the trial brief he submitted to the court: "Eight months prior to the
April 8, 1996 meeting, Castleton received Zoll's August 2, 1995 letter placing Castleton on notice of Zoll's
intent to withdraw if payment in full or a payment schedule satisfactory to Zoll was not made and followed." (R.
1672.) (Emphasis added.)
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The August 1995 Letter is further unavailing to Zoll because it violates the
requirements of Rule 1.16(d) which states that "[u]pon termination of representation, a lawyer
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interest, such as giving
reasonable notice to the client . . . ." Zoll's admittedly unclear letter was not reasonable
notice to Castleton that the lawyer-client relationship had actually and definitively ended.
Moreover, the trial court's characterization on the August 1995 Letter as the event that
signaled the end of the lawyer-client relationship completely ignores the undisputed fact that
only several days before Zoll's April 1996 ambush and inquisition of Castleton, Zoll's law
firm had performed one hour of legal services for Castleton for which it had billed Castleton.
(Trial Exh. 27; App. K.) There is simply no principled basis for concluding, as the trial court
did, that the parties' professional relationship had ended months before Zoll's firm was still
performing services for, and sending bills to, Castleton.
Finally, the trial court's conclusion that the lawyer-client relationship had ended in
August 1995 ignores Castleton's tape recorded plea that Zoll confirm that he was still
representing Castleton as Zoll began his inquisition. (Trial Exh. 24 at p. 2.) Given the fact
that seven months later even the lawyer representing Mr. Castleton's former wife believed Zoll
was or may have been representing Castleton, Tr. at R. 1983, p. 63, Castleton's confusionthe confusion of an unsophisticated layperson forced to interpret his lawyer's many mixed
signals-is certainly understandable.
At the very least, Castleton's tape-recorded utterance during the April 1996
interrogation that he believed Zoll was still representing him required Zoll to treat Castleton as
an unrepresented party under Rule 4.3(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, and to
urge Castleton to seek counsel. More important, however, Castleton's utterance is impossible
23

to reconcile with the trial court's conclusion that the relationship had been terminated through a
hopelessly confused and confusing letter from a lawyer who presumably knew how to write
clearly.
Under these circumstances-including Zoll's status as Castleton's counsel of record in
the divorce case, Zoll's clumsy, ambiguous and misleading August 1995 Letter, Castleton's
partial payment in response to the Letter, the perception of Zoll's adversary that Zoll was still
serving as Castleton's lawyer as late as November 1996, Zoll's billing of Castleton for legal
services performed just days before the ambush, Zoll's failure to pursue collection of the
account from Castleton, and Castleton's tape recorded belief that Zoll was still serving as his
lawyer-Zoll was Castleton's lawyer during April 1996.
The trial court's decision to the contrary cannot stand. Its factual findings on this issue
are clearly erroneous because they are either against the clear weight of the evidence or are
enough to allow this Court to reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.23 Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp.. 873 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah App. 1994).
The Court, therefore, should reverse the trial court's decision and rule, as a matter of law, that
at the time Zoll orchestrated the seizure of Castleton's property in April 1996, he was still
acting as Castleton's lawyer.
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This is especially true if this Court accords little deference to the trial court's findings in the manner
specified by Houghton, 962 P.2d at 61 (Because ". . .the Court has a special interest in administering the law
governing attorney ethical rules, a trial court's discretion is limited.") Even under a traditional standard of
review, however, the trial court's determination that Zoll and Castleton were not in an attorney-client relationship
as of April 1996 is clearly erroneous.
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B.

EVEN IF IT IS DETERMINED THAT ZOLL WAS NOT CASTLETONfS
LAWYER AT THE TIME ZOLL WAS REPRESENTING RICKS, ZOLL
WAS LEGALLY PRECLUDED FROM TAKING A POSITION ADVERSE
TO CASTLETON AND FROM USING CASTLETON'S CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION AGAINST HIM,

"Even in the absence of an express attorney-client relationship, circumstances may give
rise to an implied professional relationship or a fiduciary duty toward the client, thereby
invoking ethical mandates governing the practice of law." Margulies by Margulies v.
Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985). The limited extent to which a lawyer can take a
position adverse to a former client is described in the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.24
Specifically, Rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct states:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter:
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially
factually related matter in which that person's interests are
materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the
former client consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the
disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 would permit
with respect to a client or when the information has become
generally known.
The purpose of Rule 1.9 is " . . . to prevent the betrayal of a professional trust arising
out of the lawyer-client relationship." Houghton v. Dent, of Health. 962 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah
1998).

The Rule is "specifically concerned with a lawyer's acquisition of confidential

information." Houghton. 962 P.2d at 61. Houghton makes clear that the term "substantially
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While the Scope (Preamble) portion of the Rules states that "violation of a Rule should not give rise to
a cause of action, nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached," the Rules ". . .
certainly constitute some evidence of the standards required of attorneys." Woodruff v. Tomlin. 616 F.2d 924,
936 (6th Cir. 1980). Accord. Griffith v. Tavlor. 937 P.2d 297, 300 n. 7 (Ariz. 1997) (". . . professional ethics
rules are evidence of the scope of the duties owed by an attorney to a client or a former client.") See generally.
Annot., Malpractice & Liability of Attorney Representing Conflicting. Interests. 28 A.L.R. 3d 389 (1969).
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factually related matter" in Rule 1.9(a) means a clear factual connection between the former
and present representations:
In construing Utah's Rule 1.9(a), the federal courts and the Utah
Court of Appeals have referred to the necessity for a distinct,
factual link between the former and present representations. In
SLC Ltd. v. Bradford Group West. Inc., 999 F.2d 464, 467 (10th
Cir. 1993), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit stated that Utah's requirement "focus[es] on the factual
nexus between the prior and current representations rather than a
narrower identity of legal issues." Similarly, the court in Poly
Software Int'l. Inc. v. Yu Su. 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D. Utah
1995), referred to "substantial factual threads connecting the two
matters."

ML
If the former and present representations are substantially factually related, the law
presumes that the lawyer received confidential information: "The test presumes that the lawyer
acquired confidential information from the former client if the subject matter of the current
representation (of a client whose interests are adverse to those of the former client) is the same
as or substantially related to the subject matter of the former representation." Houghton. 962
P.2d at 62 (quoting ABA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct 51:201 (1997)).
In this case, there can be no question that there was a distinct factual connection
between the three cases in which ZoU formerly25 represented Castleton and the case in which
ZoU represented Ricks against Castleton. Each of the three previous cases involved a claim by
a creditor of Castleton to collect a debt that he allegedly owed. (Finding Nos. 1-3, R. 1753;
Trial Exhs. 1-13, 16-19.)

In Castleton's bankruptcy case, it involved a claim by the

bankruptcy trustee to the proceeds resulting from the sale of Castleton's condominium. (Trial

25

Of course, it is Castleton's position that, as of April 1996, ZoU was his current counsel in the divorce
case. See Argument A, supra.
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Exhs. 16-18.) In the collection case, it involved an effort by a collection agency to collect a
consumer debt. (Finding No. 2, R. 1753; Trial Exh. 19.) In the divorce case, it involved a
claim by Castleton's former wife to collect delinquent child support and alimony.
No. 1, R. 1753; Trial Exhs. 1-9.)

(Finding

Each of these cases obviously required a thorough

understanding of Castleton's assets, liabilities, and income. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 35, 36, 152,
277; Trial Exh. 38.) Castleton entrusted all of this personal financial information with Zoll to
enable Zoll to effectively represent Castleton against the claims of his creditors. IcL
In the same fashion, the principal point at issue in Ricks' claim against Castleton was
the extent to which Castleton was indebted to Ricks and the manner in which Castleton could
satisfy that debt through a surrender of his personal property. In helping Ricks to collect this
debt, Zoll was doing precisely what he had previously done for Castleton in defending against
the claims of Castleton's creditors.

All of these engagements required an intimate

understanding of Castleton's assets, liabilities and income. Indeed, no one but Zoll knew more
about Castleton's financial condition; and who better than Zoll, acting for Ricks, could have
more forcefully and effectively extracted Castleton's confession and orchestrated the seizure of
his property?
Under any fair reading of Utah law, therefore, there was a clear factual nexus between
the prior and current representations. Because the prior and current representations shared a
common factual link-the nature, extent and value of Castleton's assets, income and liabilities
in a dispute with a third-party creditor seeking to collect a debt from Castleton-the
representations were "substantially factually related" within the meaning of Rule 1.9(a). As
such, Zoll was absolutely prohibited from pursuing Castleton on behalf of Ricks.
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And wholly apart from Rule 1.9(a), Zoll's use of Castleton's confidential information
to benefit Ricks violates not only Rule 1.9(b), but the edict of Margulies bv Margulies v.
Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985).26 In Margulies. a law firm simultaneously represented
a client in the prosecution of a medical malpractice action against several health care providers
while representing two of the physician providers in a federal case involving their rights in a
limited partnership. By virtue of the firm's representation of the physicians in the federal case,
the firm acquired confidential financial information about the physicians which it could have
exploited against them in the malpractice action. In requiring the firm to withdraw from both
engagements, the court held that:
. . . prohibitions against disclosure of client confidences and
secrets have generally been interpreted to forbid an attorney from
representing a client against a former client in a matter
substantially related to the former client's representation.
[Citations omitted.] This rule is intended to prevent [even] the
possibility that an attorney might use information given in
confidence by a former client in a later action against that client.
Allowing later adverse representation when the former client's
disclosures might be used against him could inhibit the free
exchange of information between attorney and client which our
legal system presupposes.
Id. at 1202 (emphasis added).
The court further held that "the burden of showing full disclosure rests upon the
attorney undertaking adverse employment," and that "for client consent to be adequate in a
conflict of interest situation, the attorney must not only inform both parties that he is
undertaking to represent them, but must also explain the nature and implications of the conflict

26

It is important to note that Castleton never asked the trial court to base its decision against Zoll on the
existence or effect of ethical rules. Rather, Castleton simply asked the court to apply the many Utah cases which
address and resolve the issue of fiduciary misconduct through well-defined common law principles. See
Argument C, supra. It is unclear why the trial court decided to largely confine its analysis of Zoll's fiduciary
conduct to an examination of the ethical rules, other than to note that this is what Zoll asked the court to do.
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in enough detail so that the parties can understand why independent counsel may be desirable."
Id. at 1203-04. Plainly, any doubt is resolved against the lawyer.
The trial court in this case failed to heed Margulies' admonition that it is even the
potential disclosure of confidential information that must be guarded against when a lawyer is
considering whether he or she can permissibly take a position adverse to a former client.
Thus, the trial court's finding t h a t " . . . Castleton failed to provide any plausible argument how
he has been placed at a disadvantage in the matter of the theft of money from Ricks, by virtue
of any confidential information acquired by Zoll in his previous representation of Castleton,"
see Finding No. 30, is based on the faulty premise that Castleton had the burden of proving
how he was disadvantaged by Zoll's knowledge of Castleton's financial condition and
background. Under Margulies and Houghton, there is a presumption that if the past and
present representations are "substantially factually related," the lawyer acquired and used
confidential information against the former client. This Court, therefore, should reverse the
trial court's determination that Zoll was somehow privileged to take a position adverse to his
(supposedly) former client, Castleton.
C.

ZOLL BREACHED HIS FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF LOYALTY.
CONFIDENTIALITY AND GOOD FAITH TO CASTLETON.

"In all relationships with clients, attorneys are required to exercise impeccable honesty,
fair dealing, and fidelity." Kilpatrick v. Wilev. Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah
App. 1996). One of the most important responsibilities of a lawyer is to act with undivided
loyalty toward his own client:
"Where an attorney is hired solely to represent the interest of a
client, his fiduciary duty is of the highest order and he must not
represent interests adverse to those of the client . . . . [B]ecause
of his professional responsibility and the confidence and trust
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which his client may legitimately repose in him, he must adhere
to a high standard of honesty, integrity and good faith in dealing
with his client."
Id (quoting Smoot v. Lund. 369 P.2d 933, 936 (Utah 1962)) (emphasis added). The lawyer's
fiduciary duty also means:
. . . that the attorney will become unreservedly identified with his
clientfs interests and protect his rights. It means not only in
dealing with the client's adversary, but also the attorney will
adhere to the ideals of honesty and fidelity with the client; and
that he will not use his position to take any unfair advantage of
the special confidence which the client is entitled to repose in
him.
Margulies. 696 P.2d at 1204 (quoting In re: Hansen. 586 P.2d 413, 416 (Utah 1978)).
This Court has been insistent that when claims arise from a fiduciary's dealings with its
beneficiary, "such dealings should be scrutinized with great care, and the burden is upon [the
fiduciary] to show good faith in the transaction." Sweeney v. Happy Valley. Inc.. 417 P.2d
126, 129 (Utah 1966). Accord. Baker v. Pattee. 684 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 1984) ("Where a
confidential relationship exists, a presumption of unfairness arises which must be overcome by
countervailing evidence, and the burden shifts to the defendant to prove absence of unfairness
by a preponderance of the evidence.").
If the fiduciary agent does not discharge this burden, liability attaches, and the
transaction tainted by the breach will be voided:
However, if a confidential relationship is found to exist between
parties, any transaction that benefits the party in whom trust is
reposed is presumed to have been unfair and to have resulted
from undue influence and fraud. [Citations omitted.] The
benefiting party then bears the burden of persuading the fact
finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the transaction was
in fact fair and not the result of fraud or undue influence. If that
burden is not carried, the transaction will be set aside.
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Von Hake v. Thomas. 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985).
Moreover, "even if the [subservient party] consents], the transaction is voidable unless
the [fiduciary agent] has disclosed to the [subservient party] all the material facts which he
knew or should have known concerning the transaction and the transaction was fair and
reasonable in all respects." Wheeler bv and through Wheeler v. Mann, 763 P.2d 758, 760
(Utah 1988).
The rationale for the law's abhorrence of a fiduciary agent's conflicts of interest has
been eloquently stated:
The rules of undivided lovaltv have developed as defensive
responses bv the common-law nervous system to impulses of selfinterest.
The rationale of these well-settled principles of
undivided lovaltv is clear: "it is generally, if not always,
humanly impossible for the same person to act fairly in two
capacities and on behalf of two interests in the same transaction.
Consciously or unconsciously he will favor one side as against the
other where there is or may be a conflict of interest. If one of the
interests involved is that of the trustee personally, selfishness is
apt to lead him to give himself an advantage. If permitted to
represent antagonistic interests, the trustee is placed under
temptation and is apt in many cases to yield to the natural
prompting to give himself the benefit of all doubts, or to make
decisions which favor the third person who is competing with the
beneficiary." [Citations omitted.]
And in accord with this rationale, the beneficiary need
only show that the fiduciary allowed himself to be placed in a
position where his personal interest might conflict with the
interests of the beneficiary. It is unnecessary to show that the
fiduciary succumbed to this temptation, that he acted in bad faith,
that he gained an advantage, fair or unfair, that the beneficiary
was harmed. Indeed, the law presumes that the fiduciary acted
disloyally, and inquiry into such matters is foreclosed. The rule
is not intended to compensate the beneficiary for any loss he may
have sustained or to deprive the fiduciary of any unjust
enrichment. Its sole purpose and effect is prophylactic: the
fiduciary is punished for allowing himself to be placed in a
position of conflicting interests in order to discourage such
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conduct in the future. Though equity protects the beneficiary
with a gentle wand, it polices the fiduciary with a big stick. The
ffiduciarvl must avoid being placed in such a position, and if he
cannot avoid it. he may resign, or fully inform the beneficiaries
of the conflict, or. upon so informing the court, request approval
of his actions. Otherwise, he proceeds at his peril.
Fulton National Bank v. Tate. 363 F.2d 562, 571-72 (5th Cir. 1966) (emphasis added).
So it is in this case. Zoll plainly attempted to serve two masters. Pledging full fealty to
one (Ricks) at the expense of another (Castleton), Zoll ambushed, interrogated, and threatened
Castleton. He did so for the purpose of orchestrating and facilitating a late night, self-help
confiscation of Castleton's property. This meant that Zoll was simultaneously representing the
accuser (Ricks) in a dispute with the accused (Castleton). He was simultaneously representing
the creditor against the debtor, the employer against the employee, the "good" client who paid
his bill against the client who did not. Zoll's misconduct is pervasive in scope, malicious in
purpose, and damaging in effect. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine lawyer conduct that could be
more destructive to the interests of a client or former client.
Out of the chute, Zoll failed to disclose to Castleton the specific purpose for which
Castleton was being summoned to Zoll's office-to interrogate Castleton about the manner in
which he was billing Ricks and to extract a confession of liability. (Finding No. 11; R. 1755;
Trial Exh. 24.) Instead, Zoll made a tactical decision to retain the element of surprise when he
lured Castleton to his office.
This is hardly consistent with this Court's insistence that a lawyer " . . . adhere to a
high standard of honesty, integrity and good faith in dealing with his client." Smoot. 369 P.2d
at 936. Nor is it consistent with the lawyer's obligation to refrain from taking "any unfair
advantage" of the client. Margulies. 696 P.2d at 1204. The fact that Castleton agreed to come
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to Zollfs office speaks not only to the inherently unbalanced nature of the attorney-client
relationship, but to Castleton's plainly evident belief that Zoll was still his attorney.
Moreover, Zoll never prepared or provided any oral or written disclosures of any
potential conflict of interest in his simultaneous representation of Castleton and Ricks, never
had either client sign any waiver of conflict, and never told Castleton that it would be prudent
for him to retain independent legal counsel to accompany him to the meeting or to advise him
about the implications of the conflict of interest. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 106, 107; R. 1260.)
Zoll's failure to do so is a flagrant violation of his legal obligations to Castleton and his ethical
obligations27 to society. Margulies. 696 P.2d at 1203-04 ("For client consent to be adequate in
a conflict of interest situation, the attorney must not only inform both parties that he is
undertaking to represent them, but must also explain the nature and implications of the conflict
in enough detail so that the parties can understand why independent counsel may be
desirable."); see also 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law. § 213 ("An attorney's representation of
two or more clients with adverse or conflicting interests constitutes such misconduct as to
subject the attorney to liability for malpractice, unless the attorney has obtained the consent of
the clients after full disclosure of all effects concerning the dual representations.").
If Zoll had any doubts about the need for such disclosures before his ambush of
Castleton began, he certainly could have none once Castleton asked him to confirm that Zoll

27

These ethical obligations include those prescribed by Rule 1.4 (requiring lawyer to communicate
clearly and diligently ". . . to the extent reasonably necessary to enable the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representations"), by Rule 1.6 (requiring lawyer to hold inviolate confidential client information),
by Rule 1.7 (requiring lawyer to refrain from conflicts of interest absent full disclosure after consultation with
independent counsel), by Rule 1.9 (limiting lawyer's ability to take position adverse to former client and to exploit
confidential information), by Rule 1.16(d) (requiring lawyer to protect client's interests in the event of
withdrawal), by Rule 4.3(b) (requiring lawyer to assure that an unrepresented person's misunderstanding about
the lawyer's role in the matter is reasonably corrected), and by Rule 4.4 (requiring lawyer to refrain from unfairly
burdening a third person or obtaining evidence in a way that violates the person's legal rights).
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was also serving as his legal counsel. (Trial Exh. 24 at p. 2; App. C.) At that point, Zoll was
absolutely obligated to terminate the meeting, advise Castleton to obtain independent counsel,
and to disclose the substantive implications of the conflict.

Instead, Zoll blithely plowed

forward. He accused Castleton of committing a criminal act, he pressed Castleton to explain
what he had done, he extracted a confession, and, as the trial court concluded, he "facilitated"
the confiscation of almost every piece of property that Castleton owned.

(Trial Exh. 24;

Finding No. 35, R. 1760; Trial Exh. 25.)
Zoll even made the connection-through his representation of Castleton in the divorce
case-that it was the financial pressures that Castleton's former wife had placed upon him that
led Castleton to overbill Ricks. (Trial Exh. 26 at p. 2.) Finally, Zoll betrayed Castleton by
drafting and presenting the so-called "Settlement Agreement" in which Castleton acknowledged
that the late night seizure of his property was "consensual." (Trial Exh. 26 at p. 2.)
ZoU's mistreatment of Castleton is indefensible under Utah law. Zoll could easily have
avoided this abuse by declining Ricks' offer to engage him, by informing Castleton of the
obvious conflict and urging him to seek independent counsel, by stopping the interrogation
when Castleton expressed confusion about Zoll's role in the transaction, or by seeking court
approval of the proposed engagement.
Instead, Zoll brazenly ignored every obligation of loyalty, good faith, fair dealing,
honesty, and integrity in his dealings with Castleton. Zoll's egregious misconduct is a clear
breach of his fiduciary duty to Castleton. Under Utah law, Castleton is entitled to void the
transaction tainted by ZoU's breach (the seizure of Castleton's property) or recover
compensatory and punitive damages from Zoll. The trial court's inexplicable refusal to accord
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this relief cries out for reversal. This Court should do so and either rule as a matter of law
that Zoll breached his fiduciary duty, or remand for a new trial.
D.

THE TRIAL COURT'S OWN FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE
UNDERLYING EVIDENCE FLATLY CONTRADICT ITS
DETERMINATION THAT ZOLL WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR
THE LOSS OF THE PROPERTY THAT ZOLL'S OTHER CLIENT
SEIZED FROM CASTLETON.

In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court ruled that " . . . Zoll had
nothing to do with the taking of additional property by Ricks, the damage to the property while
in Ricks' possession, or the circumstances of Ricks failing to return property that he agreed to
return," Conclusion No. 9, R. 1762; that Ricks' seizure and failure to return Castleton's
property was " . . . an independent intervening cause that severed the connection between
ZoU's conduct and Castleton's claimed damages," Conclusion No. 12, R. 1762; and that
Castleton has failed to establish any damages directly attributable to ZoU's action, Conclusion
No. 11, R. 1762 (collectively "Proximate Cause Findings and Conclusions").
The Proximate Cause Findings and Conclusions cannot be sustained because they (a)
are contradicted by the trial court's own subsidiary findings and the underlying evidence, and
(b) are based on the application of an incorrect legal standard governing breach of fiduciary
claims.
Specifically, the record establishes that the Proximate Cause Findings and Conclusions
are flatly contradicted by:
(a)

the trial court's own factual finding that "Zoll was aware that certain

property was taken from Castleton's home and was going to be held by Ricks for

35

security purposes [and] Zoll facilitated this arrangement by getting the parties together
and drafting a notice of termination letter and an agreement between the parties";28
(b) Zoll's testimony that he thought it was a "good idea that Mr. Ricks take the
property";29
(c) Zoll's own written notice the day after the seizure that both he and Ricks had
confiscated Castleton's property;30 and
(d) Zoll?s testimony that he never provided Castleton with the accounting that
was an essential precondition to any return of Castleton's property.31
Moreover, the trial court's determination that Zoll's misconduct was not the proximate
cause of Castleton's losses was based on a clear misreading of Utah fiduciary duty case law.
Specifically, once it is determined that the parties are in a confidential fiduciary relationship,
". . . a presumption of unfairness arises which must be overcome by countervailing evidence,
and the burden shifts to the [fiduciary agent] to prove absence of unfairness by a
preponderance of the evidence."

Baker. 684 P.2d at 636.

If the fiduciary agent fails to

discharge this burden, liability attaches and the transaction tainted by the breach can be voided.
Von Hake. 705 P.2d at 769.

This principle applies even if the subservient party has

supposedly consented to the transaction, unless the agent has " . . . disclosed to the [subservient
party] all the material facts which he knew or should have known concerning the transaction

28

Finding No. 35, R. 1760.

29

Tr. atR. 1983 at 129:1-5.

30

Trial Exh. 25.

31

Tr. atR. 1983 at 131:1-3.
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and the transaction was fair and reasonable in all respects." Wheeler by and through Wheeler.
763 P.2d at 760.
Therefore, under Utah law, once the fiduciary agent fails to discharge his or her burden
of showing that the challenged transaction was completely fair and reasonable, a breach of
fiduciary duty results, and the aggrieved principal is entitled to relief without a further showing
that the fiduciary agent's misconduct was the proximate cause of the claimed loss. Wheeler.
763 P.2d at 760; Von Hake. 705 P.2d at 769; Baker. 684 P.2d at 636.
In this case, the trial court ignored these principles in crafting its Proximate Cause
Findings and Conclusions. The trial court's finding that " . . . Zoll had nothing to do with the
taking of additional property by Ricks, damage to the property while in Ricks' possession, or
the circumstances of Ricks failing to return property that he agreed to return," Conclusion No.
9, R. 1762, is internally inconsistent with, and contradicted by, the court's subsidiary findings
and the record.32
Moreover, the trial court's conclusion that Ricks' seizure and failure to return
Castleton's property was " . . . an independent intervening cause that severed the connection
between Zoll's conduct and Castleton's claimed damages," Conclusion No. 12, R. 1762,
stands Utah fiduciary law on its head.

It does so by focusing improperly on subsequent

misconduct (in this case, Ricks' participation in the seizure) to trump or supersede the

32

Specifically, and as noted at pp. 35 and 36 above, the court specifically found that "Zoll was aware
that certain property was taken from Castleton's home and was going to be held by Ricks for security purposes
[and] Zoll facilitated this arrangement by getting the parties together and drafting a notice of termination letter and
an agreement between the parties." (Finding No. 35, R. 1760.) In addition, Zoll testified that he thought it was a
"good idea that Mr. Ricks take the property." (Tr. at R. 1983 at 129:1-5.) Moreover, the written notice that Zoll
drafted the day after the seizure declared that both he and Ricks had confiscated Castleton's property. (Trial Exh.
25.) Finally, Zoll testified that he never provided Castleton with the accounting that was a condition to any return
of Castleton's property. (Tr. at R. 1983 at 131:1-3.)
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fiduciary's concurrent misconduct (in this case, Zoll's ambush, inquisition and orchestration of
the seizure).

In other words, when the trial court failed to determine that Zoll did not

discharge his burden of proving that the April 8, 1996 transaction was completely fair and
reasonable, it allowed Zoll to establish a defense-"independent intervening cause "-that Zoll
was not entitled to assert. By doing so, the trial court enabled Zoll to skirt Utah law that once
a breach of fiduciary duty is established, the subservient party is entitled to void the transaction
and recover damages. Thus, the trial court's decision to allow Zoll, as the breaching party, to
invoke this proximate cause argument unfairly prevented Castleton from receiving the benefit
of this settled principle of Utah fiduciary law.
Finally, in ruling that Ricks' role in the seizure was the superseding proximate cause of
Castleton's loss, the trial court failed to consider Castleton's claim that Zoll substantially
assisted Ricks in committing his tortious conduct within the meaning of § 876 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Subsection (c) of § 876 provides that "[fjor harm resulting to a
third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . gives
substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct,
separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person." Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 876(c); see also D.D.Z. Molerwav Freightlines. Inc.. 880 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1994)
(recognizing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 as standard for imposing liability on
contributing tortfeasors); Dahl v. Gardner. 853 F. Supp. 1262, 1268 (D. Utah 1984) (same).
Under the Restatement, liability also attaches "for harm resulting to a third person from
the tortious conduct of another . . . if he . . . orders or induces the conduct, if he knows or
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should know of circumstances that would make the conduct tortious if it were his own."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 877(a).33
The trial court's Proximate Cause Findings and Conclusions cannot stand in the face of
these principles. Its decision on these issues should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
A license to practice law not only vests the lawyer with potent powers, it imposes
elevated professional duties. When a lawyer abuses his position, the courts "protect [] the
beneficiary with a gentle wand [and] police the fiduciary with a big stick." Fulton National
Bank. 363 F.2d at 572. The trial court erred in this case when it declined to employ its "big
stick," and instead discounted and even rationalized Zollfs misconduct.
Zollfs betrayal of Castleton cannot be tolerated. This Court should reverse the trial
court's determination that ZoU was guilty of only "very poor judgment" and "did not breach
any duty of loyalty or confidentiality owed to Castleton" when ZoU orchestrated the seizure of
Castleton's property. In doing so, the Court should either (a) rule, as a matter of law, that
ZoU breached his fiduciary duty to Castleton and remand for a determination of Castleton's
damages, or (b) grant a new trial to enable Castleton to obtain appropriate redress against his
predatory former lawyer.
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According to comment a of this section, "if [the defendant] intends the result, it is immaterial that the
tortious means used are not those originally contemplated provided [the defendant's] order or inducement is one of
the contributing factors [to the third-party's claimed loss]." Under this principle, therefore, Zoll became
responsible for the fact that Ricks seized property far beyond that which was discussed at the parties' April 8,
1996 meeting because Zoll's clear facilitation and orchestration of the seizure was undeniably "one of the
contributing factors" of Castleton's loss.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SUZANNE RODERICK,
I
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

vs.
Civil #960905028
NATHAN RICKS, B. RAY ZOLL,
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON, ABACO
PUBLISHING, a Utah limited liability
company, ABACO INSTALLERS, a Utah
limited liability company and JOHN
DOES l-X,

Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

Co-defendant Douglas T. Castleton's cross-claim of Breach of Fiduciary Duty
against co-defendant B. Ray Zoll came before the court from September 7-9,1999
before the Honorable Judge Frank G. Noel. B. Ray Zoll was present in Court and was
represented by Steven C. Tycksen, and Cory D. Memmott. Douglas T. Castleton and the
ABACO entities were represented by John T. Anderson.
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The Court sitting as trier of fact heard and received evidence in this
matter, took the case under advisement and now finds and rules as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACTS
1. It is undisputed that in February of 1994, Zoll represented Castleton in a postdivorce proceeding (the "Post-Divorce Action"). Zoll entered an appearance to
defend Castleton in a contempt proceeding in the Post-Divorce action. After the
hearing Zoll, on behalf of Castleton, filed an objection to the proposed Order
prepared by opposing counsel. A hearing was set on the objection for April 28,
1995, and again in May of 1995, but the hearing was never held.
2. Castleton filed for bankruptcy in 1994, and in the spring of 1994, Zoll entered an
appearance in the bankruptcy Court on Castleton's behalf for the limited purpose of
arguing a Motion for relief from an Order of the Bankruptcy Court (the "Bankruptcy
Action"). After that hearing, a ruling was made and a final Order entered on 5/24/95,
and no appeal was taken.
3. On January 15,1995, Zoll filed an answer for Castleton in a collection case that was
subsequently dismissed on June 13,1995 (the "Collection Case").
4. In August of 1995, Zoll sent a letter to Castleton advising Castleton that he was
delinquent on his bill and demanded payment. Zoll stated in the letter "in any event
if you do not make arrangements with our office to begin payment on your bill within
two weeks from the date hereof, I will have no other option but to withdraw as your
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counsel in the matters that this law firm has represented you and to pursue
collection of this amount from you." Further, "if you wish to make arrangements with
our office to begin payment on your legal bill, in order to continue to receive my
services as your attorney, please contact my office immediately."
5. Zoll testified and the Zoll & Branch secretary, Janeal Lindeman, testified (through
stipulated testimony) that no contact was ever made with the firm by Castleton for
the purpose of making arrangements to pay the bill.
6. The Court finds that Castleton made a $100.00 payment subsequent to the August
letter, but that the payment was made unbeknownst to Zoll.
7. Castleton claimed that subsequent to the August letter, that a meeting was held
between he and Zoll wherein he made arrangements for payment of the bill and Zoll
agreed to continue to represent him. Zoll denies this meeting. The Court finds that
no such meeting took place.
8. Castleton testified that Zoll agreed to accept as either partial or complete payment of
the outstanding legal bill certain printing services that were to be provided by
Castleton. Castleton testified that he prepared handouts, printouts, and other items,
which he says, were delivered to a Mr. Joe Rawie for delivery to Mr. Zoll. Castleton
testified that this occurred on more than one occasion, and that the routine was for
him to deliver the materials to Mr. Rawie, who then delivered them to Mr. Zoll.
9. The stipulated testimony of Mr. Rawie is that he knew of no arrangement to trade
materials for a legal bill, and that he did not receive any materials from Castleton on
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behalf of Zoll. His testimony was also that there was no meeting between he and
Castieton wherein they discussed such an arrangement.
10. The Court finds that no such agreement was made, and that no materials as testified
by Castieton were delivered to Mr. Rawle for delivery to Mr. Zoll in payment of his
legal bill.
11. On April 8th, 1996, eight months after the August 19th, 1995 delinquency letter, there
was a meeting between Nathan Ricks, Castieton, and Zoll that occurred at Zoll's law
office. Castieton had an employment relationship with Ricks. Ricks was a longstanding client of Zoll. Before the meeting, Zoll called Castieton and asked him to
meet with he and Ricks about his employment relationship with Ricks' company the
N.S. Group. Zoll did not advise Castieton that they were going to confront him at the
meeting with an allegation that he had stolen money from Ricks.
12. At the meeting, Zoll advised Castieton that he did not represent him, but rather that
he represented Mr. Ricks. The Court finds Exhibit "P24" to be an accurate transcript
of a portion of that meeting. At the meeting, Mr. Castieton admitted to falsifying
records, and in that manner took ten's of thousand's of dollars of Mr. Ricks'
Company's money. Zoll advised Castieton at the meeting that his conduct was
criminal in nature, but the Court finds that Mr. Zoll did not threaten to call the Sheriff
and have Mr. Castieton arrested, as Castieton claims.
13. It was agreed to by Castieton and Ricks at the meeting at Zoll's office that Ricks
would follow Castieton to his home that evening and obtain whatever computer
4

hardware and software were necessary to preserve NS Group's data which was on
Castleton's computer, and also to obtain other property to hold as security for some
of the money that Castleton had stolen from Ricks. Ricks and Castleton later went
to Castleton's home, and Ricks took possession of the data and of substantial
computer and other electronic equipment as security for the debt that Castleton
owed Ricks. Zoll did not go with Castleton and Ricks to Castleton's home.
14. After looking through Castleton's home, Ricks observed a substantial amount of
electronic equipment. He then took possession of the equipment and other items, in
excess of the amount that the parties originally contemplated at the meeting in Zoll's
office. However, this was done with the consent of Castleton and Castleton even
assisted in loading the property into Ricks' vehicles.
15. On April 9th, 1996, Zoll sent a letter to Castleton advising him that his employment
relationship with NS Group (Ricks' company) was terminated and confirmed that
certain items of property were taken by Mr. Ricks and were to be held until a
complete accounting was made. The letter also stated that Zoll was representing
Nathan Ricks and NS Group.
16. On April 19th, 1996, Castleton and Ricks entered into an agreement wherein
Castleton admitted that he owed money to NS Group for money unlawfully taken
from NS Group. The agreement provided that certain property and equipment was
being held by NS Group with the consent of Ricks for security purposes. The
agreement further provided that certain equipment would be returned to Castleton
5

upon signing the agreement, and other equipment would be retained as security
pending an accounting of the amount owed to NS Group by Castleton. The Court
finds that the agreement was entered into by Castleton, knowingly and voluntarily,
and that he was under no undue duress or pressure to sign the agreement.
17. The Court notes that Castleton was subsequently charged with felony theft in Third
District Court and pled guilty to Class A Misdemeanor Theft, as a result of this
incident.
18. After the April 8, 1996 meeting and April 19, 1996 agreement, it was learned by Zoll
and Ricks that plaintiff Suzanne Roderick, Castleton's fiancee, was claiming an
interest in a substantial amount of property taken by Ricks as security, and that her
claim was by virtue of an unperfected security interest taken in connection with
certain promissory notes entered into by Castleton in favor of plaintiff Roderick.
19. Castleton claims in this case that much of the property taken by Ricks was never
returned and that much of the returned property was returned in a damaged state.
20. The essence of Castleton's claim against Zoll is for damages for property either not
returned by Ricks or damaged while in Ricks' possession. The Court notes that
plaintiff Roderick's claims against Zoll were dismissed by this Court, and that plaintiff
and defendant Castleton settled their claims against Ricks just days prior to the trial
of this matter.
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21.The Court finds that there were substantial internal inconsistencies in Castleton's
testimony and glaring contradictions between his testimony and that of other more
independent and objective witnesses.
22.The Court finds that Castieton is not a credible witness. The Court feels there is a
substantial likelihood that the action by plaintiff Roderick against Castieton was a
sham, and that while Roderick and Castieton are technically adversaries, they have
joined forces to bolster claims against Zoll. This sham is further evidenced by the
fact that during the course of this litigation Roderick and Castieton have entered into
agreements transferring their interests in the subject property back and forth at times
that seemed to suit their needs at particular stages of the litigation.
23. Roderick and Castieton, at the time of this trial resided together and were engaged
to be married which further belies Roderick's claim against Zoll of intentional
interference with her economic relationships with Castieton.
24. Defendant Castieton claims that a breach of fiduciary duty occurred arising out of an
attorney-client relationship. Two experts testified in this matter, both of them
respected members of the Bar. The defendant Zoll's expert testified that in his
opinion there was no attorney-client relationship between Zoll and Castieton at the
time of the April 1996 meeting, and the other expert was not retained to render an
opinion on that specific issue.
25. The Court finds, under all the circumstances, that as of the April 1996 meeting, there
was no attorney-client relationship between Zoll and Castieton.
7

26. The Court finds that neither Zoll nor Castleton subjectively believed at the time of the
April 1996 meeting that there was an attorney-client relationship existing between
them.
27. The Court finds that objectively speaking Castleton could not reasonably have any
expectation that an attorney-client relationship with Zoll at the time of the April 1996
meeting and after.
28. Castleton claims even if there was no attorney-client relationship that Zoll breached
a fiduciary duty imposed upon him by the Rules of Professional Conduct pertaining
to representation of clients against the interest of former clients. Castleton urges
Rule 1.9(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct upon the Court as a basis for his
claim. Rule 1.9(a) prohibits a lawyer from representing a client against a former
client in the same matter or a substantially factually related matter.
29. The Court finds that the matters in which Zoll had represented Castleton; specifically
the Post-Divorce Action, the Bankruptcy Action, and the Collection Case were not
substantially factually related to the matter involving Castleton's theft of money from
Ricks.
30. The Court finds that Castleton has failed to provide any plausible argument how he
has been placed at a disadvantage in the matter of the theft of money from Ricks, by
virtue of any confidential information acquired by Zoll in his previous representation
of Castleton.
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31.The Court finds that Castleton has failed to provide the Court with evidence of any
specific information obtained by Zoll in his representation of Castleton that was
either confidential or that was not otherwise generally known, that could
subsequently have been used against Castleton to Rick's advantage.
32. The Court finds on the basis of these facts that Mr. Zoll may have used very poor
judgment in this matter, and could have done much more to clarify the issue with
Castleton at the time of the meeting in April of 1996, but that under the
circumstances of this case that he did not breach any duty of loyalty or confidentiality
owed to Mr. Castleton under Rule 1.9 or Rule 1.7 of the rules of professional
conduct.
33. The Court finds that this is not a case where a party is seeking to have an attorney
disqualified from representing a client, but is a case where one party is seeking
specific monetary damages against a former attorney for breach of fiduciary duty.
34. In regards to damages, the Court finds that Castleton has failed to produce any
evidence that shows a causal link between the conduct of Mr. Zoll and any damages
that Castleton may have sustained.
35. Zoll was aware that certain property was taken from Castleton's home and was
going to be held by Ricks for security purposes. Zoll facilitated this arrangement by
getting the parties together and drafting a notice of termination letter and an
agreement between the parties.
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36. There is no evidence whatsoever that Zoll had anything to do with the taking of
additional property, the damage while in Rick's possession, or the circumstance of
Ricks failing to return property that he had agreed to return.
37. The Court finds that it was not foreseeable to Zoll that Ricks would not return
property that he had agreed to return, or that Ricks would damage property in his
possession.
38. Castleton has produced no evidence to establish a nexus between Zoll's conduct
and his claimed damages.
39. The Parties stipulated at trial that the issue of attorney's fees could be reserved to
be handled by affidavit and briefing after the Court's ruling on liability.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. No other legal representation was undertaken by Zoll on behalf of Castleton other
than the Post-Divorce, Bankruptcy and Collection Action.
2. The attorney-client relationship between Zoll and Castleton ended when Castleton
failed to comply with the terms of the August 1995 letter.
3. There was no attorney-client relationship between Zoll and Castleton in existence at
the time of the April 1996 meeting or thereafter.
4. Zoll did not breach the fiduciary duty owed to Castleton by appearing at the April
1996 meeting and by representing Ricks.
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5. The Post-Divorce Action, the Bankruptcy Action, and the Collection Case are not the
same matter nor are they substantially factually related to the matter of Ricks' claims
against Castleton for stealing money from N.S. Group.
6. Rule 1.9(b) provides that a lawyer cannot use information obtained in the former
representation of a client to the disadvantage of that former client, unless the
information has become generally known.
7. Zoll received no confidential information from Castleton during the Post-Divorce
Action, the Bankruptcy Action or the Collection Case, which benefited Ricks in the
subsequent representation against Castleton.
8. Zoll did not breach any duty of loyalty or confidentiality owed to Mr. Castleton under
Rule 1.9 or Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
9. The Court concludes as a matter of law that Zoll had nothing to do with the taking of
additional property by Ricks, the damage to the property while in Rick's possession,
or the circumstance of Ricks failing to return property that he had agreed to return.
10. The Court concludes that it was not foreseeable to Zoll that Ricks would not return
property that he had agreed to return, or that Ricks would damage property in his
possession.
11.There is no nexus between Zoll's conduct and Castleton's claimed damages.
12.The conduct by Ricks of allegedly causing damage to property and failing to return
property as agreed, was an independent intervening cause that severed the
connection between Zoll's conduct and Castleton's claimed damages.
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13. Castleton has failed to establish any damages directly attributable to Zoll's action.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. That the cross claimant Castleton has no cause of action against Zoll.
2. The Court rules in favor of Zoll on all issues before the Court.
3. The issue of attorney's fees is reserved for further determination pursuant
to the parties' stipulation.
DATED this Z ^

day of December 1999.
BY THE COURT:

FRA
District
Approved as to Form

JOHN T. ANDERSON,
Attorney for defendants Castleton and
ABACO Publishing and ABACO Installers
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SUZANNE RODERICK,
Plaintiff,

ORDER REGARDING ATTORNEY'S
FEES

v.
NATHAN RICKS; B. RAY ZOLL;
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON; ABACO
PUBLISHING, a Utah limited liability
company; ABACO INSTALLERS, a Utah
limited liability company; and JOHN DOES
I-X,
Defendants.
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON,
Defendant and Crossclaim Plaintiff,
v.
B. RAY ZOLL,
Defendant and Crossclaim
Defendant.

Civil No. 960905028
Judee Frank G. Noel

On December 20, 1999, the Court made and entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order (collectively "Initial Order"). The Initial Order stated, among other things, that
the issue of the parties' claims for attorney's fees would be resolved later through the submission
of motions, memoranda and affidavits.

On February 16, 2000, Defendant and Cross-Claim

Defendant, B. Ray Zoll ("ZolT), filed his motion for attorney's fees ("Attorney's Fees Motion")
against Defendant and Cross-Claim Plaintiff, Douglas Castleton ("Castleton").

Castleton

submitted papers in opposition to Zoll's Attorney's Fees Motion, and on April 21, 2000, the
Court conducted oral argument on the Attorney's Fees Motion.

The Court having read and

considered the parties' memoranda in support of, and in opposition to, Zoll's Attorney's Fees
Motion, having heard and considered the arguments, representations and stipulations of counsel,
having advised the parties' counsel of its decision to deny the Motion, and good cause appealing
for the entry of an order formally embodying the same, it is hereby
ORDERED that Zoll's Attorney's Fee Motion shall be, and hereby is, denied.
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

John T>Anderson
Attorneys for Defendant/Cross-Claim Plaintiff

Steven C. Tycksen
Attorneys for Defendant/Cross-Claim Defendant
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Doug Castlcton's Tape
(transcribed July 26,1996)

Zoll: Allrighl Doug, I just want, I want h to get dean here, okay. 1 want to clean this
deal up. Right now, I'm recording us, record this little conversation. This is your chance
to try to make due with what appears to me to be a really sensitive, ugly, little situation.
r ve just shown you these billings, like the Publisher's Assistant. Did you make that thing
up off your computer and pad it?
Castleton:
ZoD:

Yes I did.

And you padded h and sent it over to Nathan?

Castleton:

It's for labor that I did but Publisher's Assistant didn't do it.

Zoll: So then you would have, then you would give this to Rhonda. Is there even such a
thing as Publisher's Assistant?
Castleton:
Zoll

No.

So, you made up that letterhead?

Castleton:

Yes.

Zoll: And then you went ahead after you made the letterhead up and you put your work
in and you figured that you did do this, for example under this Publisher's Assistant 6,000
trim LifePack? You billed it at 15 cents yourself and billed $900.00?
Castleton*
Zoll

Yes.

And you got paid for that?
/

Cistlfton.

Yes.
-

Zoll

You knew you were getting paid for that?

Castleton:
Zoll:

At the same time you were getting paid a salaryfromNathan?

Castleton:
Zoll

Yes.

Yes.

So you knew you were double dipping there?

v/

•

/ > . .

Castleton:
Zoll:

Why did you do it Doug?

Castleton:
ZoD:

Just didn't have enough money to make the ends meet.

Pressure from your ex?

Castleton:
Zoll:

Yes.

(inaudible)

Pressure from Suzette?

Ricks: Suzanne.
Zoll: Suzanne? Did the same thing happen on most of the invoices thai you went
through? Were they padded too?
Castleton:
Zoll:

(inaudible) They were (?)

For example Replicolor Did you make up an invoice for Replicolor too?

Castleton:

Yeah, I did.

Zoll: So you wouid actually put down the hems for description then you would show
the price and then you would just...
Ricks: So, how much did you pad these things on average?
Castleton:

I don't know.

Ricks: So whatever you thought you could get away with or whatever you needed?
Castleton.
Zcll:

I can't, I'm sorry, I can't hear you Doug.

Castleton:
Zoll:

I really didn't use a rule of thumb.

Just if you needed a little extra money you padded some of it?

Castleton*
Zoll:

1 don't know (inaudible)

I did.

You know I represent Nathan in this situation I guess don't you?

Castleton

Are you representing me too?

Zoll:

I represented you in your divorce. I have nothing to do with that in this case.

Castleton:
Well I just want to make it right so...
ZoD: Are you willing to try to make this thing right?
Castleton:
Zoll:

You realize that this is criminal conduct?

Castleton:
Zoll:

Yes.

No I didn't realize it

When you actually make up an invoice, Doug?

Castleton:

I thought a designer could charge a surcharge on these expenses

Zoll: But you surcharge by making up a whole invoice, even based off a company that
doesn't exist?
Castleton:

I did and I screwed up.

Zoll: And this is a guy that was trying to take care of you Doug. If you just asked him
for some raises instead, along the way you would have probably got them. You didn't
have to do this.
Castleton:
Well I was just trying to make it come up to some level where the royalties
were going to be what we first talked about this thing. So...
Zoll: How iong did you do it? Did you do it...I've got invoices going back, it looks like,
to August of 95
Castleton:
Zoll

June of 1995^

Castleton:
Zoll:

I may have done some back to June.

Yeah, (inaudible)

How did you handle the mileage? Were you padding the miles?

Castleton:
add up

No I didn't pad miles If you want to check my odometer right now, it will

Zoll. So you just billed it straight through? It just surprises me I see, like for example,
you're going along in April and March you're about 3,4. 500 miles and then they jump up
to 2,000 miles.

Castleton:
You got to look at what we were doing during those months and where I
was going. A lot of the months when I, when we do the film and there's a lot of running
around between dowmown and the place and Provo. The miles just add up. I didn't pad
the miles.
Zoll: You were working, were you doing fide deals, working side, besides working on
Nathan's projects?
Castleton.
that.
Zoll:

I did one project for one company called Srnartcom but I didn't get paid on

So, you spent ail your efforts on Nathan's work then? Is that right?

Ricks: So, did you do any Act! consulting during that time?
Castleton:
I did three sessions total. Everything else I've been giving to Rhonda's
husband to do.
Zoll:

What about your IDN "Real Opportunity of a Lifetime**

Castleton:
Nathan.
Zoll:

You didn't pass through any cost to Nathan on the book?

Castleton:
Zoll.

It was all billed on my bills and I haven't passed through any cost on to

No.

How do you tell? I mean are you saying that you billed...

Castleton.

Well I can show you the invoice that I incurred on it from Replicolor.

Ricks I've got a question for you If we're working together and you know all my
thoughts and everything I'm wortang on and all my projects and everything and you know
v/hat my business is and we've got this arrangement, then how do you come out with your
own damn book on my time? That I've never seen, nor heard of?
Castleton:

I just didn't think that that was something that you'd be interested in.

Ricks. And how could you, how could you. when I tell you okay I'm going to give you
10% of the business and then obviously you're making so damn much more money
scamming me. doing your markups on your fcke invoices and so forth, you come out and
print your book and go in competition with me Don't you see a little bit of conflict of
interest there?

Castleton.

Yeah but that's one of the reasons that I haven't sold any books Nate.

Kicks: I mean, how do yourationalizethat?
Castleton:

I've sold ten books and those were to Sue.

Ricks: And it's not that you haven't tried to sell them
Castleton:

I honestly haven't actively gone out and tried to sell them.

Ricks: So why would you go incur a S17,CO0 bill for books that you decided that you
weren't going to sell?
Castleton:

I know, I wanted to talk to you about this.

Ricks: Oh you figured since they weren't seDing you'd come talk to me and see if I
wanted to buy them all and do a project like this so you could get out of?
Castleton:

MmHmm (Yes)

Ricks; Yeah, I'm soiry I don't buy it.
ZoB: What about the, how did the, with, what is it that, tell me what Nathan obtained or
purchased in the form of computers, equipment and software? Do you have any kind of a
list of all of that*
Casileton-

I can get them off of the invoices

Ricks. Where are all of the rest of the invoices?
Castleton:
ZoU:

Are they there at your apartment?

Castleton
Zoll:

I've almost got them all finished

MmHmm (inaudible)

Well let me tell you what, what we, what I think we should do. I'll go off.

Recorder turned off
Zoll That was the meeting with Nathan Ricks, Ray Zoll and Doug Castleton on April
the 9th, 1996 at 7.30 pm
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SUZANNE RODERICK,
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NATHAN RICKS; B. RAY ZOLL;
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON; ABACO
PUBLISHING, a Utah limited liability
company; ABACO INSTALLERS, a Utah
limited liability company; and JOHN
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CROSS-CLAIM OF DEFENDANT
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON
AGAINST CO-DEFENDANTS,
NATHAN RICKS AND B. RAY
ZOLL

Civil No. 960905028
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

Defendant Douglas T. Castleton ("Castleton") hereby cross-claims against defendants
Nathan Ricks ("Ricks") and B. Ray Zoll ("ZoU"), and seeks relief as follows:

I.
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES
1.

Castleton is, and at all times material to this action was, a resident of Salt Lake

County, Utah.
2.

Ricks is, and at all times material to this action was, a resident of Salt Lake

County, Utah.
3.

Zoll is, and at all times material to this action was, a resident of Salt Lake

County, Utah and an attorney licensed to practice law in all courts of the state of Utah.
II.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
4.

This court has jurisdiction over the claims in this cross-claim pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) and Utah R. Civ. P 13(f).
5.

Venue properly lies in this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-7.
in.
FACTS

6.

In late 1994, Ricks retained Castleton to produce certain sales aids and training

materials for Ricks' use and benefit as a distributor for NuSkin International ("NuSkin").
7.

Between late 1994 and early 1996, Ricks and Castleton reached several

agreements (collectively "Agreement") to assure that Castleton was fairly compensated for work
he performed on behalf of Ricks and Ricks' company, N.S. Group. Under the Agreement,
IllJcros 15«
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Ricks agreed to (a) pay Castleton base compensation at the rate of $2,500 per month, (b) pay
Castleton an initial royalty of fifty cents ($.50) (later increased to $1) for every HeadStart
manual that Ricks sold to his customers, and (c) pay Castleton ten percent (10%) of the annual
net profits earned by N.S. Group.
8.

From the inception of the parties' relationship, generally, and the consummation

of the Agreement, specifically, Ricks was chronically delinquent in his payment of compensation
that Castleton had earned under the Agreement. In an effort to assure that he received the
compensation to which he was entitled to under the Agreement (but which he feared Ricks would
never pay), Castleton began preparing and presenting to Ricks invoices (collectively "Invoices")
for reimbursement of claimed out-of-pocket expenses that exceeded the amounts that Castleton
had actually incurred.
9.

In the meantime, Castleton was embroiled in a protracted divorce and post-divorce

proceeding that he had initiated against his then-wife, Pamela Castleton, in 1992 ("Divorce
Case"). Zoll served continuously as Castleton's legal counsel in the Divorce Case from January
1994 to November 22, 1996 when Zoll filed his notice of withdrawal. During the course of the
Divorce Case, Castleton entrusted Zoll with extensive confidential information regarding
Castleton's assets, income, liabilities and other personal financial information.
10.

Zoll also served as Castleton's legal counsel during the summer of 1994 in a

bankruptcy case ("Bankruptcy Case") involving the distribution of proceeds from a trustee's sale.
11.

On April 8, 1996, Zoll contacted Castleton and asked him to appear at his office

at 5:30 that evening. Zoll gave Castleton no advance notice of the contemplated purpose of the
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meeting.

When Castleton appeared at Zoll's office at the scheduled time, Castleton was

surprised to see that Ricks was present with Zoll. At that point, Zoll angrily informed Castleton
- his own client in the ongoing Divorce Case and the concluded Bankruptcy Case -- that Zoll
was now serving as legal counsel for Ricks in connection with concerns that Ricks had about the
Invoices that Castleton had previously submitted. Shocked and dismayed that his own lawyer
was proposing to take a position adverse to him, Castleton objected to Zoll's simultaneous
representation of Ricks. Zoll responded that, under the circumstances, he was fully justified and
entitled to represent Ricks in his claims against Castleton.
12.

Zoll and Ricks then angrily presented Castleton with the Invoices and demanded

that Castleton confirm that the Invoices had been marked up. When Castleton conceded that
they were, Zoll told Castleton that he had committed a felony for which he could be immediately
arrested by the police and taken to jail. Zoll and Ricks repeatedly threatened Castleton that if
he did not make immediate restitution to Ricks, they would have him arrested, criminally
prosecuted, and jailed. The specter of his own lawyer angrily threatening to have him criminally
prosecuted and jailed was terrifying to Castleton and rendered him incapable of rationally
determining how to respond to Zoll's and Ricks' repeated demands to make restitution to Ricks.
13.

Zoll and Ricks then threatened Castleton that if he did not immediately accompany

Ricks to Castleton's apartment and turn over certain proprietary information that was contained
in Castleton's computers, Zoll and Ricks would immediately call the police to have Castleton
arrested and charged with a felony. Fearful that Zoll and Ricks would carry-out their threats
if he refused to cooperate, Castleton allowed Ricks and Ricks' brother-in-law, Blake Tillotson
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("Tillotson"), to accompany him to his apartment where the computers were located. When they
arrived at Castleton's apartment, Ricks and Tillotson began removing computer cables from
power sources, disassembling computers and printers, and removing and boxing-up printers,
scanners, fax machines, telephones, software disks and the like.

Ricks and Tillotson then

proceeded to the living room of Castleton's apartment and removed and took possession of
Castleton's entire CD collection, stereo, television, laser disk collection, and telephone. They
then proceeded to Castleton's bedroom and removed a television set that Castleton protested he
had purchased for his young children. Ricks and Tillotson also removed and took possession
of other telephones, a microwave oven from the kitchen, an entire drawer from a filing cabinet,
extra paper, printer cartridges, and other miscellaneous items that Castleton owned. All of the
foregoing items of personal property are referred to hereafter as the "Property."
14.

At several points throughout this nightmarish ordeal, Castleton told Ricks that

Suzanne Roderick ("Roderick") had an ownership and security interest in much of the Property
and that Ricks' forcible seizure and removal of the Property was and would be in derogation of
the rights of Roderick and other individuals who had security interests in the Property.
Undeterred, Ricks and Tillotson loaded the Property in their automobiles and Ricks told
Castleton that now that he had possession of the Property, he and Zoll would soon tell him what
further action he needed to take to assure that no criminal charges were filed.

The next

morning, Zoll telephoned Castleton and told him to remain in his apartment and not to leave
without further instructions from Zoll.
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On April 19, 1996, Zoll summoned Castleton to a meeting with Ricks at Zoll's

office. After repeatedly reminding Castleton that he would be subjected to criminal prosecution
if he did not cooperate, and telling him he had to get Roderick to release her security interests
in the Property, Zoll and Ricks "proposed" a global settlement of Ricks' and Roderick's
competing claims to the Property.

Zoll then prepared a written settlement agreement

("Settlement Agreement") which he instructed Castleton - his own client - to immediately sign
or face criminal prosecution. At that point, Castleton asked for an opportunity to take the
proposed Settlement Agreement to a lawyer for review and counsel. Zoll became enraged and
instructed Castleton to immediately sign the Agreement "or else." Fearful that he would be
jailed and criminally charged if he did not comply with ZoU's and Ricks' demands, Castleton
reluctantly signed the Settlement Agreement. After doing so, Castleton asked for a copy of the
Settlement Agreement, but Zoll refused to comply.
16.

During the next few days, Zoll attempted to negotiate a resolution of Roderick's

claims against the Property. On April 22, 1996, Zoll left a voice mail message with Castleton
which stated:
Looks like things are working out positively here. We've got to
work out a couple more terms. I think we've got it working with
[Roderick] and we're probably going to let you survive all this.
17.

During the next several weeks, Castleton repeatedly begged Zoll and Ricks to

return several items of the Property, including three computers, printers and a fax machine to
enable Castleton to perform design and other work for other clients and customers for whom he
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had contracted to work. Zoll and Ricks, however, failed and refused to do so, effectively
putting Castleton out of business.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Contract: Ricks)

through 17 above.
19.

Ricks has failed and refused to perform any of the payment obligations imposed

upon him oy the Agreement described in paragraph 7 above. His failure to do so constitutes a
material and unexcusable breach of the Agreement.
20.

• •

.

-

^*

>

has

suffered injury and damages of a character and in an amount to be established at trial.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Conversion: Ricks)
21.
t.-i; .uk*r

Castleton incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1
**••

22.

e.

Ricks' willful, coercive, aiid otherwise improper seizure and removal of the

Property from Castleton constitutes an intentional conversion of the Property.
23.

At the time of its seizure and removal, the Property had a reasonable fair market

value of at least $40,000.

I113cr«.15a
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24.

As a direct and proximate result of Ricks' conversion of the Property, Castleton

has suffered injury and damages in the amount of at least $40,000, plus interest and lost business
income in an amount to be established at trial.
25.

Ricks' conduct has been willful and/or in reckless disregard of Castleton's rights

in and to the Property, thereby justifying the imposition of punitive damages in an amount equal
to at least three hundred percent (300%) of all proven compensatory damages.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Rescission of Settlement Agreement: Ricks)
26.

Castleton incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1

through 25 above.
27.

Ricks' execution of the Settlement Agreement was coercively procured by a series

of extortionate threats to have Castleton criminally charged, jailed and prosecuted.
28.

Under these circumstances, the Settlement Agreement is voidable and Castleton

is entitled to an order rescinding the Settlement Agreement, directing Ricks to immediately
return the Property to Castleton, and requiring Ricks to compensate Castleton for the value of
his loss of use of the Property.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Zoll)
29.

Castleton incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1

through 28 above.

1113cros 15a
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30.

As Castleton's lawyer in the Divorce Case and the Bankruptcy Case, Zoll owed

Castleton an unqualified fiduciary duty of loyalty, due care, and good faith and fair dealing.
31.

T h r o u g h the conduct alleged in this Cross-Claim, Zoll has breached his fiduciary

duty to Castleton, as a direct and proximate result of which Castleton has suffered injury and
damages of a charactei and in an amoi int to be established at trial
32.

• '••••' •

Zoll's conduct has been willful and/or in reckless disregard of Castleton's rights

in and in lhe h o p n ( \ , (hneirv fiisiih tiif llic IIII|MIMIIIin nil ipiiiiili11 damages in an imounl u|iiiil
to at least three hundred percent (300%) of all proven compensatory damages.
WHEREFORE, Castleton demands judgment against Ricks and Zoll as follows:
A.

O n his first claim foi it/lief against Ricks loi
1.

D a m a g e s of a character and in a n amount to b e established at trial;

2 . • • Attornej "s fees, inter est and costs as p r o \ icieci b j law ; and
3.
B.

. •

Such other and further relief as the court deems just.

O n his second claim for relief against Ricks for:
1.

D a m a g e s for loss of the Property in the principal amount of at least

$ 4 0 , 0 0 0 , plus lost business income in a n amount to b e established at trial;
2.

himiivi ildimijit". in .in .iiiiiuiiiil u|iiiil In ill icasl lima, ihijiidieti pen nit

( 3 0 0 % ) of all proven compensatory damages;

IH3crot.l5»

3.

A t t o r n e y ' s fees, interest and costs as provided by law; and

4.

Such other and further relief as the court deems just.

9

C.

On his third claim for relief against Ricks for:
1.

An order rescinding the Settlement Agreement, directing Ricks to

immediately return the Property to Castleton, and requiring Ricks to compensate
Castleton for the value of his loss of use of the Property;

D.

2.

Attorney's fees, interest and costs as provided by law; and

3.

Such other and further relief as the court deems just.

On his fourth claim for relief against Zoll for:
1.

Damages of a character and in an amount to be established at trial;

2.

Punitive damages in an amount equal to at least three hundred percent

(300%) of all proven compensatory damages;
3.

Attorney's fees, interest and costs as provided by law; and

4.

Such other and further relief as the court deems just.

DATED this / ? '

day of November, 1997.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

John H Anderson
Attorneys for Defendants Douglas T.
Castleton, ABACO Publishing, and
ABACO Installers

lU3cros 15a
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

/f

day of November, 1997, I caused a true and correct

copy of the foregoing I ross I laim ml I hi Iniitl.iiil Pi

II|»LII

I

( iislklon

"\ i jiiisi I <»•

Defendants, Nathan Ricks and B. Ray Zoll to be mailed, via first-class, postage prepaid, to
the following:

B. Ray Zoll, Esq.
Peter M. De Jonge, Esq.
Zoll & Branch
5300 South 360 West, Suite 360
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Richard R. Golden, Esq.
Mclntyre, Golden, Horgas & ) ha/
360 East 4500 South, Suite 3
Murray, Utah 84107

1113cros.lSa
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

I hi

\greemen

tgreement") is made and entered into this

day of August, 1999 by and among (i) Suzanne Roderick ("Roderick"), (ii) Douglas T.
Castleton ("Castleton"), ABACO Publishing, a Utah limited liability company, and ABACO
Installers a 1 liah

Entities"), and (iii) Nathan

Ricks ("Ricks") and N.S. Group, a Utah general partnership ("NSG").
RECITALS
A.

,M

acquired and were

the joint owners of numerous items of personal property, including stereo and television
equipment, a substantial collection of laser discs, computer discs, and compact discs
(collectively "Roderick and Castleton Property"*

hiiMiii1 tluii .unit: time ptMi'ui Castleton

acquired and was the owner of certain computer equipment, peripheral equipment, software,
mobile telephones, a microwave oven, printer cartridges, and other miscellaneous items
(collectively "Castleton Property").
B.

On April 8, 1996, Ricks, after meeting with his lawye:, ^. Ray Zoll ("Zoll"),

b% = "asiletoij, si-imi ilr Roderick and Castleton Property and the Castleton Property as an
offset against, or as security for, a debt that Ricks claimed Castleton nwni mm .mil NSG in
connection with Castleton's independent contractor relationship with Ricks and NSG
("Independent Conti actor Relatioi i sh ip").
C. -

Pursuant to that certain Notice of Termination

("Termination Notice"), Zoll notified Castleton in pertinent part that:

1996

Pursuant to our understanding and as you have consented we have
picked up and caused to be delivered to [NSG] offices certain
equipment, files, software, furnishings and the like from your
apartment to be held by [NSG] offices pending our further
investigation of the amount of money that has been
inappropriately obtained by you.
D.

At various times after April 8, 1996, Ricks and NSG returned a few items of the

Roderick and Castleton Property and the Castleton Property, much of which was damaged,
missing integral component parts, and/or deteriorated through use.

As of the date of this

Agreement, however, neither Ricks, NSG, nor ZoU has returned all of the Roderick and
Castleton Property and the Castleton Property (collectively "Unreturned Property").
E.

In April 1996, Zoll drafted a written settlement agreement ("Settlement

Agreement") which Ricks, NSG, Castleton and the ABACO Entities signed on April 18, 1996.
The Settlement Agreement states in pertinent part:
Certain property equipment is being held by N.S. Group and/or
its bailee Nathan Ricks to secure claims of N.S. Group against
Castleton. Said property was consensually given to Ricks for
security purposes and is being held by agreement pending
execution of this Agreement.
F.

In July 1996, Roderick filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake

County, Utah a verified complaint ("Roderick Complaint") captioned Suzanne Roderick v.
Nathan Ricks, et al.. Civil No. 960905028 ("Case"). The Roderick Complaint asserted and
asserts several claims for relief against Ricks, Zoll, and several unidentified John Doe
defendants for their alleged seizure, removal, conversion and/or destruction of Roderick's
interest in the Roderick and Castleton Property and for tortious interference with Roderick's

contractual relationships with Castleton. Ricks and NSG deny that they are liable to Roderick
for any of the claims in the Roderick Complaint.
G. • In November !*>%, Ricks iiinl Zoll filed .i i, nmiinckuin i Ritks < nijiiinmh-itjii")
in the Case against Roderick for allegedly colluding with her lawyer, Richard Golden, to
extortionately induce Castleton to grant Roderick certain security interests against the Roderick
and Castleton Property and the Castleton Property. Rodent k drnirs thiii she is liable, m Kicks
for any of the claims in the Ricks Counterclaim.
H.

November 1996, Ricks filed a cross-claim in the Case against Castleton

and the ABACO Entities ("Ricks Cross-Claim") asserting claiir*
unjust enrichment. Castleton and the ABACO Entities deny that they are liable to Ricks for
iiii'i \>\ llir claims in iIn: HiL'k'i 4 ".innterclaim.
L

.

..'••/•••'.•...

In November 1997, Castleton filed a cross-claim in the Case against Ricks and

Zoll ("Castleton Cross-Claim"), asserting three claims for relief against Ricks and one claim
hv iflirl jganis1 "V111 Huls. lni»r>, ttui l,i , "ul'li" tv i astleton for any of the claims asserted
against him in the Castleton Cross-Claim.
J.

In about July 1999, Zoll claimed for the first time that he and Ricks previously

had entered into Jin Hurmneni i ",* liqinl ("t>i>|><;iainHI mid IrulminiiY Agreement") under which
Ricks committed to indemnify and hold Zoll harmless from any liability that may be imposed
on Zoll through claims asserted by Roderick and/or Castleton.

Ricks denies that he ever

reached the Alleged Cooperation and Indeminf ' Vgreernt ni with \ ''.oil and cerufie, ilo Roderick

and Castleton that he is unaware of any basis for ZolTs claim that such an Agreement was ever
reached.
K.

The parties desire to resolve all disputes between them in connection with the

Case, and to do so with a full reservation of all rights that they have or may have against Zoll
in the Case, and hereby do so on the following terms and conditions:
AGREEMENT
1.

Delivery of Unreturned Property.

Before or at the time he executes this

Agreement, Ricks, on behalf of himself and NSG, shall exercise his best efforts to locate and
return to Roderick and Castleton all of the Unreturned Property that is currently in their
possession or under their control ("Returned Property").
2.

Payment of Settlement Amount. At the time he executes this Agreement, Ricks,

on behalf of himself and NSG, shall pay to Roderick the sum of $5,000 ("Payment").
3.

Mutual Rescission of April 1996 Settlement Agreement. The parties' Settlement

Agreement dated April 18, 1996 shall be and it hereby is deemed rescinded, extinguished, and
void ab initio.
4.

Dismissal of Portions of Case. Concurrently with Ricks' and NSG's delivery of

the Returned Property and the Payment, the parties shall cause their respective legal counsel to
execute the stipulation and joint motion for order of partial dismissal with prejudice in the form
attached hereto as Exhibit A.
5.

Limited Indemnification of Ricks bv Roderick and Castleton.

With the

exception of any damages that may be incurred or assessed as a result of any claim that Zoll

might make under the Alleged Cooperation and Indemnity Agreement, Roderick, Castleton,
and the ABACO Entities hereby indemmfy Ricks and NSG against any damages that may be
incurred as a iesult of any other claim that Zoll might make against Ricks ana i\ v

or

indemnification or contribution arising out of or relating to: the Ricks and Castleton Property,
tin 1 asilch MI I ""i open \

fi In Independent Contractor Relationship, the Case, the Roderick

Complaint, the Ricks Cross-Claim, or the Castleton Cross-Claim.
6.
N;MJ

Full Release bv Roderick. Castleton and the ABACO Entities of Ricks and
W,

•••• •"•M,;^...- •-.. imposed IIIn iimI Ihr iiiiifjlitf" iflamed inula llir Agreement,

Roderick, Castleton, and the ABACO Entities, for themselves, their heirs, personal
representatives, agents and employees, hereby release Ricks, NSG (and NSG's corporate

claims, demands, actions or liabilities of any kind, known or unknown, now oi hereafter
arising in connection with, or in any way relating to, the Roderick and Castleton Property, the
Castlet*

-•

Relationship

llic I dsv

il I ic Rodern :k

Complaint, the Ricks Cross-Claim, the Castleton Cross-Claim, and the Alleged Cooperation
and Indemnity Agreement.
7.

Full Release bv Ricks and NSG of Roderick and Castleton.

Other than the

obligations imposed by and the rights retained under this Agreement, Ricks and NSG, for
themsei-,-•. theii hen s, pei sonal i: epresentatives, agents and employees, hereby release
Roderick, Castleton, and the ABACO Entities (and the ABACO Entities' corporate affiliates,
parents, subsidiaries, partners, officers, agents, and employees) from any and all claims,

demands, actions or liabilities of any kind, known or unknown, now or hereafter arising in
connection with, or in any way relating to, the Roderick and Castleton Property, the Castleton
Property, the Independent Contractor Relationship, the Case, the Roderick Complaint, the
Ricks Cross-Claim, the Castleton Cross-Claim, and the Alleged Cooperation and Indemnity
Agreement.
8.

Full Reservation of Rights against Zoll. It is expressly understood and agreed

that the settlement embodied by this Agreement is and shall be without prejudice to the rights
of Roderick, Castleton and the ABACO Entities to pursue all available claims in the Case
against Zoll, and Roderick and Castleton hereby reserve their rights to do so.
9.

Ownership of Claims. The parties acknowledge, declare, represent and warrant

that they have not heretofore assigned, transferred or hypothecated, or purported to assign,
transfer or hypothecate, to any third person or entity, any liability, claim, demand, action,
cause of action, or right released or discharged in this Agreement.
10.

Attorney's Fees. In the event of any defaults in any obligations imposed by this

Agreement, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable
attorney's fee, which may arise or occur from enforcing this Agreement, or any part hereof, or
in pursuit of any remedy provided hereunder or by law, whether such remedy is pursued by
filing a suit or otherwise.
11.

Non-Reliance.

This Agreement is executed without reliance upon any

statement, representation, promise, inducement, understanding, or agreement by, or on behalf
of, any representative, agent, servant, employee, attorney, or other person employed by any of

the parties, other than the promises, agreements, and commitments set forth in the foregoing
Recitals and in this Agreement.
12.

Compromise of a Disputed Claim.

The parties understand and agree that this

Agreement is a compromise of disputed claims and defenses and shall not be construed as an
lUlnnssion 01 com rssiuui nl h nihility h\ .IIIP'I

i Hit |MI lie

.ill nil n bnn v \pirssh

iien\ Jim mil

all liability whatsoever.
13.

Choice of Laws. This Agreement shall be construed pursuant to the laws of the

! iiiiie ol Utah.

14.

Entire Agreement.

The provisions of this Agreement embody and reflect the

entire understanding of the parties and there are no representations, warranties or undertakings
:fMn those expressed and stil inrih ill llii". Agreement and,, in the < ai ious exh ibits tc ill is
Agreement.

The provisions of this Agreement shall not be modified or amended in any way

except by writing signed by all parties.
15.

Authority to Execute.

Each party signing this Agreement and each part} on

whose behalf each party signs this Agreement warrants that he or it is duly authorized to enter
inii i jjnd I'xeuuk llir
16.

V^itrtrincml

•

.

•'

• • .

Successors and Assigns. This Agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit of

each party hereto and each party's predecessors, affiliates, subsidiaries, successors, assigns,
luiliiiT,

limilcil

fMitiKT*

apnih

nfliirp

Hiiplovtvs

sIi<iii?lioidt'is

assiii unci

It'^al

representatives, insurance carriers, sureties and representatives, heirs, executors, and/or
administrators.

17.

Partial Invalidity.

If any term or provision of this Agreement shall be held

invalid or unenforceable, the remaining terms and conditions of the Agreement shall not be
affected thereby, but each such term and provision shall be valid and enforced to the fullest
extent permitted by law.
18.

Notices and Deliveries.

All notices and deliveries contemplated by this

Agreement shall be given or delivered to the following addresses:
If to Roderick:

Richard R. Golden
Mclntyre & Golden
360 East 4500 South, Suite 3
Murray, Utah 84107

If to Castleton and the ABACO Entities:

John T. Anderson
Anderson & Karrenberg
50 West Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2006

If to Ricks and NSG:

R. Stephen Marshall
Durham, Evans, Jones & Pinegar
50 South Main Street, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

19.

Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts with the same

force and effect as if executed in one complete document.

However, there is no effective

agreement until each of the parties hereto has executed at least one counterpart.

._\

*-?/>*r\r'^ C : /' '

Suzanne Roderick

/t
DougjasT. CaStleton
y

ABACO PUBLISfflNG, I K '

B>
\

Douglas Y. Castletqn
"Its Managing Member

ABACO INSTALLERS, LLC

/-

By

f
^ L
4 ^ - L\*
Douglas T. Castleton
Its Managing Member

Nathan Ricks
N.S GROUP

Nathan Ricks
Its General Partner

n

X C ^

_._

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
-John T. Anderson (#0094)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Attorneys for Defendants Douglas T. Castleton,
ABACO Publishing, and ABACO Installers

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SUZANNE RODERICK,
Plaintiff,
v.
NATHAN RICKS; B. RAY ZOLL;
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON; ABACO
PUBLISHING, a Utah limited liability
company; ABACO INSTALLERS, a Utah
limited liability company; and JOHN DOES
I-X;
Defendants.

STIPULATION AND JOINT MOTION
FOR ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE OF (i) PLAINTD7FS
COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT
RICKS, (ii) DEFENDANT RICKS'
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST PLAINTIFF,
(iii) DEFENDANT CASTLETON'S CROSSCLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT RICKS,
AND (iv) DEFENDANT RICKS' CROSSCLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS
CASTLETON AND ABACO ENTITIES

Civil No. 960905028
Judge Frank G. Noel

Plaintiff Suzanne Roderick ("Roderick"), through her undersigned counsel, defendant
Douglas T. Castleton ("Castleton"), ABACO Publishing and ABACO Installers (collectively
"ABACO Entities"), through their undersigned counsel, and defendant Nathan Ricks
("Ricks"), through his undersigned counsel, hereby stipulate and jointly move for the entry of
an order (i) dismissing with prejudice, as against Ricks, Roderick's verified complaint dated

EXHIB!JT

O R D E R E D as follows:
1.

Plainti)

complaint dated Julj 11

1996 shall I K

i i i icl it II ten el n is

dismissed with prejudice as against defendant Nathan Ricks.
2.

Defendant Ricks' counterclaim dated November 19. 1996 shall be, and it hereby

is dismissed w illli piqiiidn/e.
3.

'

•

. .

The cross-claim of defendant and cross-claim plaintiff Douglas 1. Castleton

dated November 18. 1997 shall be, and it hereby is, dismissed with prejudice as against
defendant and cross-claim defendant Nathan Ricks.
4.
November 18

The cross-claim of defendant and cross-claim plaintiff Nathan Ricks dated
1996 shall be, and it hereby is dismissed with prejudice as against defendant

and cross-claim defendant Douglas T. Castleton, A B A C O Publishing and A B A C O Installers.
5.

Each of the parties shall bear its own attorney's fees and costs.

6.

nissal '.liiilll mil hinil HI ill <iih HWiiiin alteu I hi lights of

plaintiff or defendants Castleton, A B A C O Publishing and A B A C O Installers to assert all
available claims for relief against defendant B. Ray Zoll in this case.
• D A T E D th is

da> if \ I igust. 1999.
BY THE COURT:

Frank G. Noel
Third District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
McINTYRE & GOLDEN

Richard R. Golden
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR

R. Stephen Marshall
Attorneys for Defendant Nathan Ricks
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

John T. Anderson
Attorneys for Defendants Douglas T. Castleton,
ABACO Publishing, and ABACO Installers

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
John T. Anderson (#0094)
50 West Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Attorneys for Defendants Douglas T. Castleton,
ABACO Publishing, and ABACO Installers

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
SiAII 1)1 ITAH

SUZANNE RODERICK,
Plaintiff,
v.
NATHAN RICKS; B. RAY ZOLL;
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON; ABACO
PUBLISHING, a Utah limited liability
company; ABACO INSTALLERS, a Utah
limited liability company; and JOHN DOES
I-X;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE OF (i) PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT
RICKS, (u) DEFENDANT RICKS'
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST
PLAINTIFF, (iii) DEFENDANT
CASTLETON'S CROSS-CLAIM
AGAINST DEFENDANT RICKS, AND
(iv) DEFENDANT RICKS' CROSSCLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS
CASTLETON AND ABACO ENTITIES

)
)

Civil No. 960905028
Judge Frank G. Noel

The court having read and considered the parties' Stipulation and Joint Motion for
Order of Dismissal With Prejudice of (i) Plaintiff's Complaint Against Defendant Ricks, (ii)
Defendant Ricks' Counterclaim Against Plaintiff, (iii) Defendant Castleton's Cross-Claim
Against Defendant Ricks and (iv) Defendant Ricks' Cross-Claim Against Defendants Castleton
aiv, \B-M\) liniitu^ ami L'OIHI caust. appearing ihetclm ti i* Hereby

July 11, 1986, (ii) dismissing with prejudice Ricks' counterclaim against Roderick dated
November 18, 1996, (iii) dismissing with prejudice Ricks' cross-claim against Castleton and
the ABACO Entities dated November 18, 1996, and (iv) dismissing with prejudice as against
Ricks Castleton's cross-claim dated November 18, 1997. This stipulation and joint motion are
made without prejudice to the rights of Roderick, Castleton and the ABACO Entities to
continue to assert and prosecute their claims in this case against defendant B. Ray Zoll.
DATED this

day of August, 1999.
McINTYRE & GOLDEN

Richard R. Golden
Attorneys for Plaintiff
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR

R. Stephen Marshall
Attorneys for Defendant Nathan Ricks
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

John T. Anderson
Attorneys for Defendants Douglas T. Castleton,
ABACO Publishing, and ABACO Installers

0622snpulation and joint motion
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B. RAY ZOLL (3607)
Attorney for Plaintiff
5300 South 360 West, Suite 360
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Telephone (801) 262-1500

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL

DOUGLAS CASTLETON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 924901543

PAMELA CASTLETON,

JUDGE RQKICH

Defendant.

Zoll
Plaintiff,

&

Branch

hereby

and B.

withdraw

as

Ray

Zoll, Attorneys

counsel

for

the

Plaintiff.

22^

DATED this

day of November, 1J396.--

B. Hay/ffoll
Attdrrfey for Plaintiff

for

the

above-named

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on the -^jr*

day of November,

1996, X mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OP
WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL in the first-class mail, postage prepaid, to
Sharon A. Donovan
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Ut 84101-2167
7342 South Lanua Street
Midvale, UT 84047
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July 1, 1994
RayZoll
Zoll & Branch
Re:

Response to Affidavit of Pamela Castleton in Response to Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of His
Motion for Summary Judgment

Dear Ray,
I AM EXTREMELY DISTRESSED AND DESPONDENT OVER THE STATEMENTS MADE BY
PAMELA CASTLETON WITHIN HER AFFIDAVIT. These are my thoughts about Pam's responses
within it:
My Affidavit: At the present time, Defendant Pamela Castleton is employed at the Old Meeting House
and earns an income of $700.00 per month.
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 4 ofPUuntiffs Affidavit, I am employed at the Old Meeting
House, however, I earn approximately $500.00 gross per month. My wage is $7.00 per hour and I
work an average of 15 to 20 hours per week, depending on the events scheduled at the facility in a
given time period.
3.
She verified to the Court that she was earning $700 per month during the Hearing in June, 1993.
Now she claims to only earn $500 per month based on 15 to 20 hours per week.
a.
She is gone from the kids during the weekdays much more than 15 to 20 hours (50-60)
and she also works Saturdays. Where is she going when she leaves the kids so often if it's not to
work?
b.
She works for her family (her parents own the Old Meetinghouse ("OM")reception
center) and Jason, my son, has told me how he gets income of his cousin combined and reported
within his paycheck. His grandma does this because his cousin, although he works at the OM, is
too young to be employed, so they report his with Jason's gross wages. If they'll manipulate the
income of their grandsons, I would highly suspect that they would manipulate the income of their
daughter.
c.
If Pam is only working 15 to 20 hours per week, but can leave the kids to support a 40
hour work week, why isn't she working 40 hours at $7.00—other than to intentionally underemploy herself as she accuses me of doing further within the Affidavit? She's claimed that stress
and having to take care of 5 kids makes her just too tired to work more, but she doesn't take care
of the kids, leaves them all the time anyway, and the rest of the world can work full time, so buck
up babe!
My Affidavit: Since the end of April 1994,1 have been employed at Progressive Installers andl
currently earn approximately $1,000.00 per month, making 20 percent of gross installation sales.
Further, 1 have earned an average of$l, 000.00 per month for the past six months.
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs Affidavit, my attorney has repeatedly
requested verification of Plaintiffs income and employment and, to date, it remains unverified
Accordingly, there is no competent, credible evidence of Plaintiffs income other than his own selfserving statements.
4.
I don't recall receiving repeated requests for verification of my income and employment other
than the request that Sharon prepared on June 15, 1994.
a.
This is nothing more than a ploy based on lies to justify the statement that "Accordingly,
there is no competent, credible evidence of Plaintiffs income other than his own self-serving
statements."
b.
During the hearing of May and June, 1993, Sharon got the Judge to accept income
records from 1991 for my corporations (which was gross income to the corporations, not me, but
also disallowed the expenses of the corporations to offset the income), a year before I was

I

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT

divorced. That was when I was at the peak of my income earnings, but sadly, just before the IRS
shut down the tax savings benefit I was marketing to the trucking industry. Consequently, my
income dropped dramatically in 1992 and she made a big case of discrediting me, implying to the
Judge that I was lying about my income, and consequently, the Judge imputed $2,000 per month
on top of the $2,000 salary I was earning at the time. I believe that this is no more than another
ploy on Sharon's part to begin painting a picture to the Judge that I am lying about my income
(again, as they're implying).
My Affidavit: / have recently undergone a substantial reduction in my income. At the time of the
divorcet1 was making $5,400.00 per month that was later reduced by the Court to impute $4,000.00 per
month.
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs Affidavit, I believe that Plaintiff is voluntarily
under-employed and is not using his best efforts to make the most possible income in order to assist in
supporting me and our five children.
5.
Being voluntarily under-emploved is an interesting and unique concept, at best, and an outright
lie, at worst. Not using my best efforts to make the most possible income "in order to assist in supporting
me and our five children" is supportive of Pam's whole philosophy that she expects me to take care of her
the rest of her life.
a.
She has no basis to support her belief, other than stating this as a ploy to lure the Judge
into forming a bad opinion of me and to gain his sympathy for her.
b.
I am working from 7 am to 8 pm and as late as midnight every day, including Saturdays,
to earn my income. I'm learning a new trade with the hope of establishing a more stable, reliable
income than I've had over the past 2 years
c.
Pam stated, under oath last year, that she feels that she is entitled to the lifestyle that she
was accustomed to, but that I am not. Pam fully expects me to earn over $50,000 per year in
order to net the $23,300 (after FICA, Federal withholding with 1 exemption, and State
withholding) for the sole purpose of providing the total support she requires each month to
maintain her exact standard of living. She doesn't expect me to assist her in her support, she
expects me to be the sole provider of it.
My Affidavit: Prior to the divorce, I obtained a high school diploma and a year and a half of college,
and was earning an average of $65,000.00. I was doing quite well as a self-employed tax consultant.
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs Affidavit, throughout our marriage, Plaintiff
was a very hard worker and always earned a comfortable income. It has only been since the divorce
that Plaintiff allegedly has been unable to continue to earn sufficient income. Plaintiff possesses all
the skills and ability to continue to earn a comfortable income, however, he is intentionally earning
less money to avoid his support obligations to me and the children.
6.
Pam is lying again within her Affidavit through her statement that I have "always earned a
comfortable income." Her statement that "it has only been since the divorce that Plaintiff allegedly has
been unable to continue to earn a sufficient income" is an outright lie and manipulation of the Court
through her statements to discredit me, contrary to evidence submitted to the Court last year by me. The
statement that I am "intentionally earning less money to avoid his support obligations to me and the
children" is slanderous, unsupported and again, a lie.
a.
I submitted documentation to the Court containing a summary of my earnings
throughout our marriage. It showed substantially low earnings for the six year period from 1982
through 1987. This was a very difficult time and certainly not a period of "comfortable income."
In 1982,1 had my cars repossessed. In 1983, we lost our home and I filed bankruptcy. In 1984,
my attorney sold us a house on contract that we lost in 1987 because I couldn't afford the
payments. In 1987, Pam's father bought us a house in Sandy where Pam still resides. It was
only in 1988, when I was fully employed as a tax consultant to the trucking industry, where I was
earning a "comfortable income." This income continued until the latter part of 1992 when the
IRS totally shut down the tax savings benefits that was the sole basis of my consulting income.
Without the tax consulting opportunity, my earnings were historically low. For her to state that I
have always earned a comfortable income is another lie and a ploy to discredit me to the Judge.

My Affidavit: Since suffering the loss of my business and income, I have also suffered the loss of all
assets, including my furniture, car, and condominium. This resulted in a judgment entered against me in
the amount of SI 8,000.00 for support arrearage.
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 11 ofPlaintiffs Affidavit, it has been Plaintiffs own actions,
irresponsibility andfailure to abide by the orders of the Court which have led to the alleged losses and
the substantial judgment for child support and alimony being awarded against him.
10.
It has been nothing more than my inability, regardless of my honest, hard-working efforts, to
earn enough income to pay for my support obligations that caused me the loss of everything I own. Here
again, they're rendering judgment of me that I'm irresponsible which, again, is a slanderous ploy to taint
the Court's opinion of me. I testified honestly last May and June 1993 that I had no resources within my
corporations to earn any income whatsoever. Sharon got the Judge to believe her, but despite that, my
testimony held to be true as proven by the last year's events.
My Affidavit: Between June 1993 and December 19931 provided resumes to 40 different companies and
actively sought employment but was unsuccessful at that time.
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs Affidavit, although Plaintiff did apparently
send resumes to a number of companies, I believe that Plaintiffs actual desire and efforts to obtain
employment were less than genuine and, again, were effected by his continued desire to take any steps
necessary to avoid paying child support and take responsibility for his children.
11.
Pam has absolutely no basis to support or determine her belief of my actual desire and efforts to
obtain employment. Who is she to say that they were genuine or not? Where does she get off with saying
that I have a continued desire to avoid paying child support?
a.
Even at the contempt hearing on August 17, 1993,1 informed the Judge that I had an
interview with a prospective employer at 11:00 a.m. who contacted me because someone who I
had talked to previously about my desire to find employment told him about me and he called me.
b.
Even when I wasn't contacting prospective employers, I was talking with everyone I
came in contact with so that I could let them know that I was seeking a job. I did this to establish
a network of people to talk with someone with a hope of word getting to someone who would
want to hire me.
c.
My efforts to obtain employment were greatly restricted because of two major factors: 1)
My lack of a college degree; and 2) My income requirements imposed upon me by the Court. I
require at least $60,000 per year in gross salary in order to fully pay my support obligations of
$1,941,50 to Pam and provide only $500.00 for me to live on. Most companies require a college
degree for upper management positions that compensate employees in that high income range.
d.
I was fighting an uphill battle all the time because I was seeking employment that paid
compensation at over 414 times the average income of a Utahn. Even if I sought a job which
yielded me with zero dollars to support myself and provide only the money to pay my support
obligations, I was still requiring compensation at almost 4 times the average income of a Utahn.
($13,000)
My Affidavit: On August 17, 1993, when I was feeling the lowest point in my life, the Court sent me to
the Salt Lake County Jail. At that time, I was harassed and frightened, and this was a humiliating
experience. The Court then added another S3,162.25 to the support arrearage.
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 13 ofPlaintiffs Affidavit, it was Plaintiffs own conduct and
inability to abide by the orders of the Court that resulted in Plaintiffs incarceration for failure to pay
support In addition, I was not responsible for having Plaintiff incarcerated.
12.
It's true that I didn't have the ability to pay the support obligations. I hadn't received any money
for almost two months, hadn't received any unemployment benefits, yet the Court found that my inability
was intentional, thus I was put in jail. Pam needs to take responsibility for her actions at some point in
time. It's true that she can't actually sentence me to jail, but without the specific, affirmative actions she
took to get me to the sentencing, I wouldn't have been sent to jail in the first place. She served me with
an Order to Show Cause and filed a contempt action against me—not the Court. She testified to the Judge
and requested him to send me to jail so that I could "learn a lesson." Again, this is a typical "Pam lie"
that she has signed her name to under oath and penalty of perjury.

My Affidavit: There have been continual threats and harassment made by the Defendant wherein she
states she is sending me to jail again. She is using this as a form of control and manipulation to keep me
from seeing the children. She constantly remarks: "You >e going to jail!" Defendant is also making
serious remarks about me to the children, which are and attack on my fatherhood.
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs Affidavit, it is solely within the discretion
and power of the Court to incarcerate Plaintiff for his failure to pay support I do not have the power
nor authority to decide whether or not Plaintiff should be imprisoned for his failure to take
responsibility for his children.
13.
At least she gets somewhere with this statement. She admits that it's within the discretion and
power of the court to incarcerate me. She just stops short and doesn't even respond to the allegations I
make in my statement. The Court doesn't serve me with a motion for contempt—Pam does. And it is this
continual threat and harassment that she makes against me. Now here we are again, only two months
later, after going through continued hearings over her last contempt motion drawn out for 3 months where
the Judge ruled that there was no contempt, she's harassing me with another motion again.
My Affidavit: The alimony and child support obligations were based on a monthly income of $4,000.00
but there has been a substantial reduction in my income resulting in a substantial change of
circumstances since the entry of the Divorce Decree, which was not contemplated at the time of the
Decree.
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs Affidavit, I deny than any decrease in
Plaintiffs income has been anything other than voluntary on his part and it should not be a basis for
further decrease in his support obligations.
14.
Facts:
a.
$2,000.00 of the $4,000.00 income was based on a salary that I was earning from my
employment at North American Note Brokers, Inc. I was laid off on June 22, 1993 and lost that
income.
b.
The additional $2,000.00 income imputed to me by the Court was based on income the
Court believed I was receiving from my corporations. First, I received no income from the
corporations because they had already ceased operations at the time of the ruling. Second, I lost
ownership of all of my corporations through my bankruptcy filed on January 19, 1994.
c.
I have no means of earning the income imputed to me by the Court through resources
available to me at the time of the hearing last year. This is certainly not voluntary on my part
and I've had to pursue a whole new trade in an effort to earn a steady income.
My Affidavit: / am currently unable to pay Defendant the amount originally ordered by this Court even
though I have been trying.
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 17 of Plaintiff s Affidavit, I have received less than $200.00
in support for five children over the last approximately two months. This does not constitute even a
good faith effort to attempt to provide even a minimum support for Plaintiffs own children.
15.
Hear again, she's playing the role of judge and jury to determine what a good faith effort on my
part is. I've paid more than half of what I've earned to her up to this present time:
a.
The computer consulting and book publishing income that I was earning on a selfemployed basis between October 1993 and April 1994 came to a standstill in April. I did not
make any money in April from services rendered and on April 27, 1994 I was hired by
Progressive Installers as a carpet installer.
b.
I get paid bi-weekly. Progressive gets paid on its jobs on a bi-weekly basis also. With
the lag time of Progressive getting paid on its jobs and me getting paid from Progressive, I didn't
receive my first wages until May 20th in the amount of $142.00. I submitted a payment to ORS
on May 24th in the amount of $71.00
c.
My next wages were on June 3rd for $382.25. I submitted a payment for health
insurance premiums to National Casualty in the amount of $114.00 on that same date. I also
submitted a payment to ORS on June 8th for $110.00.

Pam conveniently forgets that we couldn't afford a house payment for a whole year in 1986. She
forgets that we shared one car for 2 years, that I rode my bike to work for that period of time, that
four of us lived in a small 2 bedroom apartment for VA years, that many times we didn't even
have money for groceries and relied on our families to feed us, etc., etc., etc.
b.
I was hired by North American Note Brokers in September, 1992 at $24,000 per year.
This was still considered by Pam to be "insufficient" and that is when she Sharon brought in my
1991 earnings to the Court in May of 1993 to prove that I should have an additional $2,000 per
month income imputed to me. I was laid off in June, 1993. In July, 1993,1 filed for
unemployment and continually sought employment opportunities by sending resumes to
companies that I felt would benefit from my services. I was not offered an income that would
provide the monies to support my obligations to Pam and established myself to provide computer
consulting services on a self-employed basis from September, 1993 through April, 1994.
Additionally, I pursued an income opportunity through Interior Design Nutritionals, but was
unsuccessful. I also attempted to supplement my income through publishing and selling a book
about nutrition to IDN distributors. Throughout this time, I talked to everyone I came in contact
with about employment opportunities. In February, 1994,1 met Dee Parsons, a carpet installer. I
told him about my inability to earn a steady income, expressed my dismay about my dilemma and
stayed in communication with him until April, 1994, he called me to offer me a job with him to
install carpet. This is certainly not "allegedly" being "unable to continue to earn a sufficient
income."
c.
Her assertion that I am "intentionally earning less money to avoid his support
obligations to me and the children" is slanderous, unsubstantiated, and a lie. I've taken
affirmative action to learn a new trade because the skills that I possess have proven to be
unmarketable because of the college degree that I am lacking. I work each day to exhaustion in
order to earn a steady income and am certainly not "intentionally" earning less money and am
certainly not trying to avoid my support obligations. I'm merely attempting to re-align my
obligations with my income so that I'm not continually threatened and harassed with contempt
charges to put me in jail.
My Affidavit: In September, 1992, my tax consulting business was phased out by the Internal Revenue
Service. This reduced my income from $65,000.00 per year to zero and has had a damaging effect on my
pride and efforts.
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 8 of Plaintiff7s Affidavit, although verification has been
requested, no evidence has ever been provided, other than Plaintiffs own self serving statements that
his tax consulting business was indeed "phased out9* by the IRS. No competent credible evidence has
been presented to indicate this decrease in income is anything other than voluntary on Plaintiff s part
1.
How is it that a statement by me made under oath of an Affidavit is a "self-serving" statement,
but all the allegations made by Pam which are totally unsubstantiated are not? Here again, she is lying
outright about evidence submitted that the IRS phased out the tax consulting business.
a.
In June, 1990, Pam accompanied me to Washington, D.C. where I attended IRS
hearings regarding the proposed phase-out of the tax savings I was marketing. She was fully
aware of the impending elimination of this tax savings area. She read the documents with me
and we discussed it in full detail.
b.
During the Hearings of May and June, 1993, we submitted both supporting testimony
from a competitor in the tax consulting business, and documentation from the IRS manuals that
supported the elimination of this tax savings area. Mr. Les Larson, accountant of Interstate
Trucking Services, testified under oath that his firm (with which I was previously employed and
was later a competitor of my tax consulting business) experienced a reduction in employees from
over 60 to 3 within the time period of 1991 to 1993 as a direct result of the phase-out of the tax
savings. We submitted copies from the IRS regulations and code manuals that substantiated the
phase-out of the tax savings area. For her to state that there has been "no competent credible
evidence...presented to indicate this decrease in income is anything other than voluntary on
Plaintiffs part" and "no evidence has ever been provided, other than Plaintiffs self-serving
statements that his tax consulting business was indeed 'phased out' by the IRS" is defamatory,

contrary to credible evidence submitted to the Court, and again, a blatant attempt to slander me
to the Court.
c.
Again, her statement that "although verification has been requested" is another
manipulation to discredit me. The only verification requested was dated on June 15th and this
Affidavit is dated on June 20th. How can I be expected to comply with the request, submit the
documentation, and return it to Sharon within 1 day? That was the time period between
receiving the request and then receiving this Affidavit.
My Affidavit: In June of 19931 obtained (sought) employment with a series of companies relating to
the development of a job. At that time I was earning a monthly income of $1,941.41 and my child support
income was imputed by the Court.
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Affidavit, even at the modification hearing,
the Court did not find Plaintiffs evidence of income credible and imputed to Plaintiff$4,000.00 per
month income. Even at this imputed level, Plaintiff has still not desired to pay support payments on a
timely basis.
8.
This seems to be an attempt to remind the Court that they did not find me to be credible at the
hearing last year, so the Court should not find me to be credible now. To say that I have not "desired to
pay support payments on a timely basis" is again, slanderous and without plausible foundation.
a.
Throughout the continued contempt hearings with the Court from February to April,
1994,1 continually expressed my desire to pay my support payments. However, I also expressed
my inability to earn the income to provide the full support payments. That is when Judge Rokich
admonished me to submit a reduction motion to bring my support payments in line with my
ability to pay.
b.
Who is Pam and Sharon to tell me what my desire is? Who appointed them God with
the ability to read my mind and tell me what I desire?
c.
The imputed level of $4,000 per month income was excessively high at the time it was
imputed and, despite my testimony to the Court that I was not earning an additional $2,000 per
month on top of my salary and did not have any resources within my corporations to provide the
additional income, provides further support of my inability, rather than my desire to earn less
than the imputed income level. Besides all of this, I lost my corporation through my bankruptcy
that the Judge imputed income for me last year.
My Affidavit: On June 22, 1993,1 lost my title and employment thereto. I then tried to obtain
unemployment compensation and benefits.
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Affidavit, Plaintiffs own statements about
his employ ability and desire to obtain employment to his maximum potential are not credible, given
Plaintiffs history of voluntary underemployment
9.
Where in the world does Pam and Sharon come up with pulling a "history of voluntary underemployment" out of the air and using it as a basis to base my desire to obtain employment? They've made
this determination based on their own allegations and are now using it to prove, more or less, that I have
no desire and am not using my maximum potential. This again is a slanderous ploy to discredit me with
the Court, without any foundation in truth and actual experience.
a.
I was laid off from my salaried job of $2,000.00 per month with North American Note
Brokers, Inc. on June 22, 1993. Being totally devastated and scared as to not have any money to
pay support to Pam, I immediately contacted Job Service to provide monies to pay a portion of the
obligation. I was told that I would not be eligible for benefits until July.
b.
I filed for unemployment compensation in July. Throughout July and August 1993, Job
Service reviewed the application, sent out verification to my former employer, and went through
their process to determine my eligibility.
c.
Finally, in September, 1993,1 began receiving payment of unemployment benefits in the
amount of $260.00 per week.
d.
I updated and prepared my resume and began sending it to prospective employers.

d.
My next wages were on June 20th for $390.02. I had to purchase parts for my 1986
Chevy Blazer that had an engine and transmission go out on it in the first week of May that I
thought was going to cost over $400, but it didn't. I submitted a payment to ORS on July 1st for
$200.00
My Affidavit: Thus, I respectively request this Court to grant the Petition to Modify to reduce support
based on my $1,000.00 per month income.
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs Affidavit, I deny that any modification of the
support obligation is appropriate.
16.
No response is necessary to this, other than to point out that I've been put in a deep hole, have
been trying to climb out, and all she wants to do is keep making the hole bigger so I never will see the
light of day.
My Affidavit: Furthermore, the Defendant has brought a Restraining Order against me wherein it states
I am not entitled to overnight visitation with my children while residing with my fiance. However, the
Defendant does not enforce her Restraining Order in that she has been allowing the children to stay with
me at nights at her convenience and according to her whim. For the reason that she fails to abide by the
rules as outlined in the Restraining Order, it should be removed.
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs Affidavit, I have abandoned the restraining
order restraining Plaintifffrom overnight visitation with the children and Plaintiff has normal
weekend visitation without restriction.
17.
Again, the only times she has allowed me to have the children overnight is when she has wanted
to stay overnight in Layton at her boyfriend or when she just spent thousands of dollars on getting her
breasts enlarged and needed to recover. The last two weekend periods, she has let me take the kids and it
appears that she has abandoned the order, but isn't she making herself out to be the judge in this matter?
Doesn't the Court need to remove this restraining order? This is just another perfect indication that she
feels that she is above the law and can do anything she wants to do.
Pam has lied throughout her Affidavit and I believe that she and Sharon have committed perjury
throughout it to discredit me with the Court. They are slandering me with allegations that are not only
unproven, but have been proven to be to the contrary through evidence and testimony submitted to the
court. Furthermore, this new contempt action is just another harassment by Pam to punish me for not
being able to earn the income she wants me to have. When I asked Pam on Tuesday, June 28th, why she's
seeking to put me in jail again for 30 days, that it will cost me my job that I've worked so hard at learning
(Dee will hire someone else to work with him on the carpet jobs and I'll lose mine) and that will provide a
steady income for me to be able to pay her and I won't receive any income for that whole month, her
response was, "maybe you just need to learn tofinda better paying job that will give me the $2,000 per
month that you're supposed to pay."
Also, Jason (my 14 year old son) has told me that Pam's been cutting me down to him a lot lately
concerning the money that I'm trying to reduce for support of the five children. She's told him that
I'm lazy and just trying to get out of paying for them. Jason said he'd testify to this if we want him
to.
For some reason, Pam is taking the $241 amount and trying to make it look to the Court that that's the
amount I'm trying to get the reduction to. When she states in her other papers that I'm trying to reduce
the support for each kid down to $48 per month, she's basing it on the $241, not the $349. Regardless,
that's the amount I should pay based on my income and I just want to get it in line with what I can pay so
I can get out of this hole.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oOoDOUGLAS CASTLETON,
ORDER MODIFYING DECREE
OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 924901543
PAMELA CASTLETON,
Judge William B. Bohling
Defendant
-oOoPlaintiff's Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce and
Defendant's Motion for Contempt and Other Related Matters came on
regularly for trial on October 4, 1994, before the Honorable John
A. Rokich, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff
appearing in person and by and through his attorney, B. Ray Zoll,
and Defendant appearing in person and by and through her attorney,
Sharon A. Donovan, and the Court having heard testimony of the
parties and thereafter the Court having discussed this matter with
counsel and the parties, and thereafter, the parties having entered
into a Stipulation in this matter to resolve the issues herein, and
said Stipulation having been read into the record in the presence
of both parties, and the Court being fully advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

The Court approves the parties' stipulation.

2-

The Decree of Divorce entered on August 13, 1992, and as

further modified by the Court on August 17, 1993, is further
modified as follows:
A.

Support.

Based

upon

imputed

income

to

Plaintiff of $3,000.00 gross income per month, and an
imputed gross income to Defendant of $1,200.00 per month,
child support shall be based upon the Child Support
Guidelines in the amount of $881.82 per month, and the
sum of $500.00 per month, as and for alimony, for a total
support obligation of $1,381.82 per month. This support
shall commence with the month of October, 1994, and shall
be paid one-half on the 5th and one-half on the 20th days
of each month thereafter, until the children reach their
age of majority, or graduate from high school in their
expected senior year.
The parties shall exchange tax returns by May 15th
of each year, commencing with May 15, 1995.

It is the

Court's intention that there be no decrease in support,
based upon the May 15, 1995, tax returns and possibly an
increase in support at that time.

Either party, based

upon the tax information may petition the Court for a
review of the support.
B.

Contempt.

The issue of contempt shall be

reserved, pending compliance by Defendant.
2

C.

Judgment.

Defendant

shall

be

granted

a

judgment against Plaintiff in the sum of $20,413.70,
which represents any and all arrearages owed to Defendant
through October 4, 1994.

Subject to the Court's input,

the parties have agreed that there be a one-year grace
period, until October 4, 1995, before Defendant can
execute on this judgment, provided Plaintiff remains
current on his support obligations.

If he does not

remain current on payments, Defendant may execute on the
judgment, together with the judgment interest rate of
5.72%.
D.
period,

Minimum Payment.
to-wit:

After the one-year grace

commencing

with

October

4,

1995,

Plaintiff shall make a minimum payment of $100.00 per
month on the arrearages, in addition to his support in
the

amount

of

$1,381.82

per

month.

If

Defendant

remarries and the alimony terminates, Defendant agrees to
pay at least $500.00 per month on the arrearages, until
the arrearages, plus interest, are paid in full.
E.

Life Insurance. Plaintiff shall obtain a term

life insurance policy in the sum of $50,000.00 on his
life, with the children named as the sole and exclusive
beneficiaries thereon.

This life insurance policy will

be obtained within thirty days of October 4, 1994, towit:

November

5,

1994, and
3

Plaintiff

shall

notify

Defendant when the policy is in place, together with the
policy number and Plaintiff shall supply verification of
the insurance upon request.
F.

Medical Insurance.

Plaintiff shall obtain

medical insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor
children, and the new Child Support Guidelines effective
July 1, 1994, shall apply, which requires the parties to
share equally the premiums for the health insurance
related to the children and shall equally all non-covered
medical and dental expenses, until the children reach the
age of majority.
G.

Attorney's Fees.

Each party shall pay their

own attorney's fees.
H.
Plaintiff

Medical
owes

Debts.

one-half

The
of

parties

medical

agree

bills

that

totalling

$480.50, or $240.25.
In addition, Defendant has paid some bills for which
Plaintiff owes one-half. The total amount that Plaintiff
owes

to Defendant

for those bills

is

$185.35, and

judgment shall enter against Plaintiff in that amount.
Said amount shall be paid to Defendant within thirty days
from October 4, 1994, to-wit: November 4, 1994.
In addition, there is an outstanding medical bill
relative to an accident at school, and after Defendant
pursues an insurance claim through the school, if there
4

is any remaining balance, the parties shall share the
balance equally.
DATED this

2£>

day of
BY THE COURT :\J

^-s*~.

District Court Judge

T

Approved as to form:

B. RAY ZOLL
Attorney for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the rUy ^"~ day of December, 1994, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Modifying Decree of
Divorce was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
B. Ray Zoll, Esq.
Zoll & Branch
5300 South 360 West
Third Floor, Suite 360
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DOUGLAS CASTLETON,
Plaintiff,

]|
>
])

OBJECTION TO ORDER
MODIFYING DECREE OF
DIVORCE

vs.
Civil No. 924901543

PAMELA CASTLETON,

Judge William B. Bohling

Defendant.

COMES now the Plaintifff by and through his counsel of
record, B. Ray Zoll, and hereby submits his Objection to the
proposed Order Modifying Decree of Divorce, as follows:

1.

Under Paragraph A. Support, the language should be

as follows [revisions are underlined]:
The parties shall exchange tax returns by May 15th of
each year, commencing with May 15, 1995. It is the
Court's intention that there be possibly an increase or
decrease in support at that time, based on the 1994 tax
returns. Either party, based upon the tax information
1

may petition the Court for a review of the support.

2.

Under Paragraph B. Contempt, the language should be

as follows [revisions are underlined]:
The issue of contempt shall be dismissed.

3.

Under Paragraph D. Minimum Payment, the language

should be as follows [revisions are underlined]:
After the one-year grace period, to-wit: commencing with
October 4, 1995, Plaintiff shall make a minimum payment
of $100.00 per month on the arrearages, in addition to
his support in the amount of support determined by the
Court at that time. If Defendant remarries and the
alimony terminates, Defendant agrees to pay at least
$500.00 per month on the arrearages, until the arrearages,
plus interest, are paid in full.

4.

Under Paragraph F. Medical Insurance, the language

should be as follows [revisions are underlined]:
Plaintiff has obtained medical insurance coverage for
the benefit of the minor children, and the new Child Support
Guidelines effective July 1, 1994, shall apply, which
requires the parties to share equally the premiums for
the health insurance related to the children and shall
share equally all non-covered medical expenses, until the
children reach the age of majority.
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The Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Order be revised
accordingly, in order to reflect the above corrections.
DATED this

\j

day of February, 1995.

. Z0L
Attorney! for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, on this / 7
February, 1995, to the following:
Sharon A. Donovan
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167
Attorney for Defendant
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August 2, 1995

Douglas Castleton
7342 South Launa Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Re:

Delinquent Account

Dear Doug:
Please find enclosed ,a copy of your latest billing statement,
In reviewing your file, I have discovered that you are delinquent:
in the payment of your legal bill, I will accept a 15% reduction
in the amount of your bill if it is paid in cash within two (2)
weeks from the date hereof. In any event, if you do not make
arrangements with our office to begin payment on your bill within
two (2) weeks from the date hereof, I will have no other option
but to withdraw as your counsel in the matters for which this lav;
firm has represented you, and to pursue collection of this amount
from you.
I am cutting back on my case load in order to be able to
spend more time with my family, and in order to provide more
effective services to my clients. If you determine to retain the
services of alternative counsel, I will support you and your new
lawyer in the transition of your case. I do hope we can remain
friends, and I wish you the best of continued success.
If you wish to make arrangements with our office to begin
pr-yment en your legal bill, in order to continue receiving my
services as your attorney, please contact my office immediately.
Very truLy^v^urs

i/^~)
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Zoll & Branch
Attorneys at Law
5300 South 360 West
Suite 360
Salt Lake City UT 84123

EXHIBIT

3A

Statement Submitted To:
Douglas Castleton
c/o Abaco Installers LLC
P. 0. Box 17612
Salt Lake City UT 84117-0612

April 1, 1996
Reference #22397
Hrs/Rate

Amount

Professional services
03/21/96 Runner fees to pick up books.

For professional services rendered

1.00
10.00/hr

1.00

10.00

$10.00

Additional charges:
03/21/96 Runner fees.

Total costs

7.00

$7.00

Interest on overdue balance

$71.11

Total amount of this bill

$88.11

Previous balance

$4,651.67

J

Douglas Castleton

Page 2
Amount

Balance due

$4,739.78
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April 9, 1996

TOi

DOUGLAS CASTLETON
F0 BOX 17612
SLC, DT 84117-0612

FROMI

B. RAY ZOLL
KQTICK OF TKRMIHATIOH

Notice is hereby given to Douglas Castleton and its
subsidiaries or affiliates from Nathan Ricks of NS Group that you
are hereby terminated from any consulting or independent contractor
relationship between you and NS Group its subsidiaries or
affiliates.
This notice is given for cause as described in the meeting at
the offices of Zoll and Branch acting as attorneys for Nathan Ricks
and NS Group whereon a variety of improprieties have occurred by
you*
This termination is effective immediately and you are hereby
directed to cease and desist from using any of the NS Group
proprietary trademarks, copyrights, training manuals, slides,
promotional materials, lists of names of distributors, vendors or
customers which are all property rights of NS Group. Further you
are directed to disassociate yourself and your related entitles
with any vendors utilized in your capacity as an independent
consultant with NS Group.
Pursuant to our understanding and as you have consented we
have picked up and caused to be delivered to the NS Group offices
certain equipment, files, software, furnishings and the like from
your apartment to be held by NS Group offices pending our further
investigation of the amount of money that has been inappropriately
obtained by you. Upon a complete accounting being made it is the
position of NS Group that you will provide restitution for said
monies and you have allowed NS Group to set off any unpaid money
due the NS Group against the present fair market value of the
equipment
that has been consensually seized and is being held as
B
°?2 r i t y for this repayment. It is further understood that funds
paid by NS Group have been used to purchase certain equipment which
» « 8 s the equipment rightfully owned by NS Group and which will be
more fully accounted for shortly.

We request that you stay in communication with us on a daily
basis until we determine the accounting and decide what other legal
course of action may be taken*
Please feel free to contact me at the above entitled office.
Very trulvypurs.

BRZ/acf
ccs

Nathan Ricks
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AgpgKPusirr
Comes now the parties, Doug Castleton, hereafter referred to
as "Castleton*' and KS Group and its related parties, hereinafter
referred

to

partially

as

to

"N.S." and

satisfy

hereby enter

a present

dispute

into

this Agreement

between

them*

This

Settlement Agreement is based upon the following facts x

1. Castleton has provided at the request of NS Group certain
services involving production of materials, tapes, videos, manuals
for the NuSkin

business

and downline of N.S* Network as an

independent contractor.

2.

N.S. was satisfied with the services and product provided

by Castleton until it was discovered that Castleton had created
false and fictitious invoices delivered to N.S. to pay monies not
lawfully due N.S. and did in fact obtain money from N.S. under
those false pretenses for more than was actually due and payable to
actual vendors.

3.

Castleton admits he owes for said made up invoices.

I*
11

If
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PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
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NS Group desires to have additional time to do discovery

and account for the obligation owed to N.S* and this Agreement has
no effect whatsoever on that claim.

5,

Certain property equipment is being held by N.S. Group

and/or its bailee Nathan Ricks to secure claims of N.S* Group
against Caatleton.

Said property was consensually given to Ricks

for security purposes and is being held by agreement pending
execution of this Agreement:. The parties further agree as follows:

A.

Upon execution of

this Agreement

the

following

equipment will be returned to Castleton:

0

K /'

3.
4.

B.

The

following

equipment

shall

continue

retained by Ricks:

1.
2.
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be

3.
4.
5.
6.

C.

Castleton does hereby release, hold harmless and

indemnify N.S. and Nathan Ricks from any and all claims that
may be asserted against N.S. or Nathan Ricks resulting from
his work relationship with N.S. and Nathan Ricks or from the
consensual possession of the property described herein.

D.

Castleton accepts the termination of relationship as

reflected in the termination letter dated the
Aft"- ^

B.

^ ^

day of

1996.

Any violation or breach of this Agreement subjects

the breaching party to payment of all damages, reasonable
attorney fees and costs associated with enforcement of this
Agreement.

6.

RIGHTS IN RESULTS OF SERVICES,

Castleton acknowledges

and agrees that the results of any services rendered by him or
others under his direction under the proper jeapiflsaast: of N.S. is

exclusive, confidential and proprietary information and property of
N,S« Group and is not to be disclosed to any person or entity other
than N*S., except with H.S-'s prior written consent.

7,

INVENTIONS.

Castleton acknowledges and agrees that all

ideas, discoveries, developments, lists, suggestions, procedures,
relationships, and

inventions

(collectively, the

"Inventions")

which he conceived or reduced to practice during the course of, or
as a result of, any services shall be the exclusive property of
N.S. and should be promptly communicated
During

the

period

of

this

Agreement

to U.S. In writing*

and

thereafter

at

any

reasonable time when called upon to do s o b y N . s . f Castleton agrees
to execute applications for domestic or foreign letters patent,
copyrights (both state and federal), assignments and such other
documents and instruments and to perform such other acts, which
N.S.

reasonably

requestsr

in

order

to

secure

to

N*S*

full

protection and ownership of the rights in and to the inventions
and/or in connection with the preparation, filing and prosecution
of

applications

inventions,

for

letters

patent

or

copyrights

for

the

N.S. agrees to bear all expenses in connection with

preparation, filing and prosecution of applications or letters
patent or copyrights and for all matters provided in this Paragraph
requiring the time and/or assistance of Castleton after termination

4

of this Agreement*

8*

CONFIDKHTIAL INFORMATION,

Castleton acknowledges that

any and all information of any nature which has been or may be
disclosed or discovered either directly or indirectly to Castleton
by N,S. or any of its affiliates is confidential, proprietary and
secret in nature and Castleton agrees# without
confidential,

proprietary

and

limitation, to

maintain

the

secret

character

thereof.

Upon request of N.S., termination,, or expiration of this

Agreement/ Castleton will surrender or caused to be surrendered to
M.S.

all

lists

discovered

and other written

by Castleton

information received by or

or prepared

in

connection

with this

Agreement or the performance of any services pursuant to employment
related to this Agreement, as well as all other property belonging
to N*S-

The obligations of Castleton under this paragraph shall

survive the termination or expiration n TJITJJXLI nywrfr for a period of
five (5) years*

9.

COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE. Castleton will not directly or

indirectly own, manage, operate, join, control or participate in
the ownership, management, operation or control of, or be employed
or otherwise connected in any manner with any business which at
anytime during such period directly or indirectly competes with

N.S. in the trade areg^ which is worldwidef for a period of five (5)
years subsequent to the date on which his employment by N.S.
CtW Tf,K

terminates for any reason,

10.

*

*

**

Castleton shall not compete either directly or indirectly

in any service or function that is similar in nature to N.S.'s
services which includes but is not limited to development of
training materials, audio and video tapes related to the businessr
promotion and training efforts and materials, FAX on demand,
satellite, voice-mail, and all other related functions in the
NuSkin/IDN/University businesses-

Furthermore, Castleton, after

termination shall agree not to use the cont acts he has made while
employed with N-S« in any way for his own benefit or business*

11.

HO OTHER AGREEMENT.

Castleton represents that he is not

a party to any other agreement which would prevent him from
entering into this Agreement or which would adversely affect this
Agreement or the performance of any services hereunder in any
manner*

12.

ENFORCEMENT

OF COVENANTS.

Castleton

agrees

that

a

violation on his port of any covenant contained in this Agreement
will cause such damage to N-S. as will be irreparable and for that
6

reason, Castleton further agrees that N.S. shall be entitled as a
matter of right, to an injunction out of any court of competent
jurisdiction, restraining any further violation of said covenants
by Castleton/ his employees, partners, or agents•

Such right to

injunction shall be cumulative and in addition to whatever other
remedies
damages.

H.S* may

have

including,

specifically,

recovery of

Castleton expressly acknowledges and agrees that the

respective covenants and agreements shall be construed in such a
manner as to be enforceable under applicable laws if a more limited
scope of time is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to
be required.

13•

NOTICES.

Notices,

demands,

payments,

reports

and

correspondence shall be addressed to the parties hereto at the
address or such parties set forth below or to such other places
which may from time to time be designated in writing to the other
party. Notices hereunder shall be effective upon personal delivery
or two days following deposit in the United States mail, postage
pre-paid.
If to Castleton, to:

/0

7
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If to N.S., tos

With a copy toi

DKEED this

/ ?

day of

A*<

K.S• Group

./ 1996.
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